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GIVING ARBITRATION SOME CREDIT:  THE 
ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
UNDER THE CREDIT REPAIR 
ORGANIZATIONS ACT 
Genevieve Hanft*
 
 
In today’s economy, the effects of a bad credit report are devastating to 
consumers.  Individuals with poor credit history are often crippled in their 
ability to purchase even the smallest item, and consequently turn for help to 
credit repair organizations advertising services that cure bad credit.  
Frequently, however, these organizations merely accept high fees from 
customers already in dire financial straits, without improving their 
financial standing.  To combat these predatory practices, Congress passed 
the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), which imposes several 
requirements on credit repair organizations.  One such provision mandates 
that credit repair organizations give a form to each consumer that clearly 
explains their specific rights before any contract is signed.  This required 
disclosure form notifies consumers that they have “the right to sue” a 
credit repair organization that violates any provision of the CROA.  
References to this right, however, appear nowhere else in the statute. 
Many credit repair organizations include mandatory arbitration clauses 
in their contracts with consumers.  As a result, consumers who have 
received a form notifying them of a “right to sue” may be told, by both 
companies and courts, that they may not seek redress in a court of law.  
Circuit courts have split on the enforceability of these arbitration 
agreements. 
In the context of both consumer protection law and recent arbitration 
jurisprudence, this Note examines the purported collision between the 
CROA and the longstanding Supreme Court policy in favor of enforcing 
arbitration agreements pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.  After 
examining the passage of the CROA and the history of arbitration as a 
mechanism for dispute resolution, this Note analyzes the divergent 
approaches taken by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits in addressing this conflict.  Ultimately, this Note 
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would like to thank Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley for her guidance and all my friends 
and family, especially my grandparents and step-parents, for their patience, love, and 
support.  Special thanks to Mom, Dad, Ali, and Liz for their endless confidence in me.    
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recommends that courts enforce these arbitration clauses in order to 
preserve the viability of arbitration as an effective method of dispute 
resolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, Richard Schreiner faced massive debt obligations.1  At a loss for 
how to fix it on his own, Schreiner contacted Credit Advisors, Inc., a 
business offering debt management services.2  He signed an agreement with 
the company to resolve his $15,392 debt in exchange for monthly payments 
of $400.3  After five years of these monthly payments, Schreiner still owed 
over $5000 of his original debt.4
Believing that Credit Advisors had deceived him, Schreiner decided to 
bring his claims to court.
 
5  He filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of Nebraska6 for violations of the federal Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA).7  But Schreiner never got his day in court.8
 
 1. See Schreiner v. Credit Advisors, Inc., No. 8:07CV78, 2007 WL 2904098, at *1 (D. 
Neb. Oct. 2, 2007). 
  
The agreement he had signed with Credit Advisors contained an arbitration 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at *3. 
 5. See id. at *4. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 8. See Schreiner, 2007 WL 2904098, at *12. 
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agreement, and the district court issued an order compelling Schreiner to 
submit his claims to arbitration.9
In urging the court to deny arbitration and allow him to bring his claims 
in court, Schreiner pointed to a provision in the CROA that informs 
customers of credit repair organizations that “[y]ou have a right to sue a 
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization[s] 
Act.”
 
10  How could it be possible, argued Schreiner, that he could be barred 
from court when the statute under which he was suing specifically informed 
him that he had a right to sue?11
The answer lies in the perceived conflict between the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)
 
12 and the CROA.  The FAA requires courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”13  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the FAA as manifesting a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements” and has consistently compelled arbitration of a 
diverse array of claims.14
This Note addresses the unresolved question of the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements under the Credit Repair Organizations Act.  While 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits have 
enforced such agreements, finding that the CROA does not preclude 
arbitration,
  But what of the CROA’s declaration of a “right 
to sue?” 
15 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has refused to 
enforce these arbitration clauses, finding that the CROA entitles plaintiffs to 
a judicial forum.16
This conflict arises against a backdrop of debate over all mandatory 
arbitration agreements between consumers and businesses.
 
17  Scholars and 
legislators alike have argued that such agreements are unjust.18
 
 9. See id. 
  A refusal to 
 10. See id. at *9–10; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a). 
 11. See Schreiner, 2007 WL 2904098, at *10–11. 
 12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 13. Id. § 2. 
 14. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see 
also infra Part II.C–D. 
 15. See, e.g., Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay 
v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 17. See generally Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness 
Act:  It’s All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151 (2009); Mark E. 
Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
133 (2004); infra Part III.B.3.  
 18. See generally Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration:  What Process is 
Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer Contracts:  Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It 
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
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enforce such agreements, however, would fly in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s clear mandate to lower courts to enforce arbitration agreements.19
This Note examines the current circuit split over the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements under the CROA in the context of both consumer 
protection law and relevant arbitration jurisprudence.  Part I discusses the 
development of consumer protection law and the enactment of the CROA 
and examines the statute in detail.  Part II describes the history and 
procedure of arbitration and examines the development of the Supreme 
Court’s policy regarding arbitration.  Part III then analyzes the circuit split 
over the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the CROA and the 
arguments for and against enforcing mandatory consumer arbitration 
clauses.  Part IV advocates for the enforcement of such arbitration clauses, 
presenting several reasons why consumers are not harmed by the 
enforcement of such agreements.  Finally, Part IV proposes a simple 
solution to the problem:  the elimination of credit repair organizations. 
 
I.  THE CREDIT REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS ACT 
This part introduces the origins and developments of consumer protection 
law.  Next, it discusses the passage of the CROA and examines the CROA 
in detail.  Finally, it highlights comparable statutes enacted under state law. 
A.  From Caveat Emptor to Meaningful Disclosure:  The Origins and 
Development of the Consumer Protection Movement 
The American legal system has provided protection to consumers for 
centuries, albeit not always in the form of a comprehensive, effective legal 
framework.20  The common law protected consumers by applying to 
consumer disputes legal principles such as warranty obligations stemming 
from a contractual relationship and deceit actions grounded in tort law.21  
Any government involvement in consumer issues generally flowed from a 
desire to maintain market stability.22
Statutory protection of consumers began with the establishment of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914.
 
23
 
 19. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of 
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395 (2009) [hereinafter Carbonneau, 
Triumph]; Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 233 (2008) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Revolution]; Richard E. Speidel, Consumer 
Arbitration of Statutory Claims:  Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its 
Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998).  
  Originally enacted to monitor 
only “unfair methods of competition,” Congress amended the Federal Trade 
 20. See Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1979) (“The American economy has paid lip service for two hundred years to the twin 
laissez-faire principles of vigorous competition and consumer self-reliance, the latter 
embodied in the maxim caveat emptor.”). 
 21. See JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 22. Reich, supra note 20, at 9. 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006); SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 35.  
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Commission Act in 1938 to extend the Act’s scope to cover “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”24  Subsequently, American consumer 
protection law underwent an expansion in the 1960s.25  Currently, this area 
of the law reflects an amalgamation of principles from contract, tort, 
criminal, property, business, corporate, constitutional, and civil rights law.26
1.  Truth in Lending Act 
 
From 1950 to 1980, the amount of credit extended to individuals by 
financial institutions increased nearly fifteen fold.27  With this expansion in 
the use of credit,28 the law began to provide comprehensive protection to 
consumers in various aspects of credit transactions, most notably with the 
enactment of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in 1968.29  TILA is a section 
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), the purpose of which is to 
provide meaningful disclosure of credit terms to consumers.30  TILA was 
the first federal law aimed at protecting consumers in obtaining credit,31 
and the law was thought to improve the inadequacies of consumer 
protection at the state level.32  Consumer protection at the federal level has 
continued to expand since TILA’s passage, with the enactment of numerous 
federal statutes designed to protect consumers from deceptive practices.33
 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 45; SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 
 
21, at 35. 
 25. See Alderman, supra note 17, at 152 n.16 (arguing that consumer protection was 
“[l]imited” until the 1950s and early 1960s, when President John F. Kennedy outlined four 
basic consumer rights in an address to Congress); see also Mark E. Budnitz, The 
Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization of Consumerism, and 
Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (2010) (discussing how the 
expansion of consumer protection law occurred as a result of the civil rights movement and 
the effort by lawyers to alleviate poverty). 
 26. See RONALD D. COLEMAN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO CONSUMER LAW 
4–9 (1997). 
 27. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, CONSUMER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 40 (2d ed. 1981). 
 28. See JOAN M. BURDA, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CONSUMER LAW 5 (1998) (“[C]redit 
is no longer a luxury but a necessity . . . . The credit industry is a multibillion-dollar 
operation, and credit permeates every facet of daily life.”). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f; see H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 3 (1967), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965 (“Consumer credit has become an essential feature of the 
American way of life.”). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r. 
 31. See id. § 1601(a) (describing the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as 
“assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to . . . 
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair 
credit billing and credit card practices”).  
 32. See Budnitz, supra note 25, at 1154. 
 33. See generally BURDA, supra note 28 (excerpting and discussing numerous consumer 
protection statutes, for example the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j); 
Alderman, supra note 17, at 152.  
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2.  Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Numerous problems and inconsistencies in the credit business arose with 
the increased use of credit.34  The credit reporting industry became 
increasingly important, given that obtaining a credit report on each loan 
applicant is a prerequisite to lending.35  Therefore, an inaccurate or 
unfavorable credit report came to be potentially devastating to consumers.36  
Common law, however, provided little protection to those who were injured 
by an inaccurate credit report.37  As a result, Congress enacted the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)38 in 1970 “to insure that consumer reporting 
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and 
a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.”39  The FCRA sought to 
regulate consumer reporting agencies40 and provided consumers with the 
right to dispute incorrect information about their credit history.41  The Act 
thus gives consumers the right to access their credit file after being denied 
credit based on information from a credit report.42
 Upon receiving a claim from a consumer disputing the accuracy of her 
report, an agency must conduct a “reasonable reinvestigation” free of 
charge to the consumer.
 
43  Usage of inaccurate information is a violation of 
the FCRA.44  Nevertheless, although designed to combat “unfair credit 
reporting methods,”45 the FCRA instead created a new loophole for 
questionable business practices—and a new channel by which consumers’ 
credit may be damaged—by enabling the operation of credit repair 
organizations.46
 
 34. See EPSTEIN, supra note 
 
27, at 213 (attributing the increase in consumer credit to a 
greater supply of “high priced items that a consumer could use while paying for them”). 
 35. See id. at 53–55. 
 36. See 136 CONG. REC. 18,766 (1990) (“Consumers with bad credit histories can find it 
impossible to borrow to buy a car, purchase a home, or even . . . to rent an apartment.”) 
(statement of Rep. Annunzio).  
 37. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 55–57 (discussing why consumers rarely triumphed in 
common law causes of action disputing an inaccurate credit report); see also SPANOGLE ET 
AL., supra note 21, at 280 (“Neither the marketplace nor the common law created a reliable 
mechanism for correcting inaccurate credit reports.”). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681(x). 
 39. Id. § 1681(a)(4). 
 40. Id. § 1681(a)(2)–(3) (“An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating 
and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general 
reputation of consumers.  Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in 
assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.”). 
 41. Id. § 1681m; see also 134 CONG. REC. 21,394–95 (1988). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j.  If consumers have not yet been denied credit based on a credit 
report, credit bureaus are authorized to charge a small fee for access to a credit file. Id. 
§ 1681j(f). 
 43. Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).  Once the information is verified as accurate, there is no way to 
remove it from an individual’s credit report. See Leonard Sloane, Need Credit?  Be Wary of 
Clinics Offering Help, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1988, at 52. 
 44. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 66. 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 46. See 134 CONG. REC. 21,395 (1988); see also infra Part I.B.1. 
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3.  Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
In yet another affirmation of the importance of credit in American 
society, Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 
1974.47  The ECOA prohibits lenders from discriminating against 
applicants on any basis other than creditworthiness.48  Originally written to 
prohibit discrimination in lending based on sex or marital status,49 
amendments made in 1975 rendered it a violation of the ECOA to 
discriminate on the basis of, among other things, race, age, color, religion, 
and national origin.50  The ECOA makes the inability to repay a loan the 
only legal basis for the denial of credit.51
B.  Increased Protection Leads to Increased Predation 
 
1.  The Development of Credit Repair Organizations 
Despite these efforts to resolve the problems facing consumers in credit 
transactions, the statutory protections of TILA, the FCRA, and the ECOA 
did not have a wholly protective effect.52  The provisions of the FCRA that 
allow consumers to dispute unfavorable credit reports led to the creation of 
organizations seeking to profit from these new rights.53  These credit repair 
agencies advertise themselves as being a quick fix for those thwarted by bad 
credit.54
 
 47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006).  A study showing that lenders discriminated 
against women in granting credit precipitated the passage of this act. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 
§ 502, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691); see EPSTEIN, supra 
note 
  They attempt to provide this rapid credit improvement by taking 
advantage of a provision within the FCRA which states that disputed 
information that cannot be verified within thirty days must be deleted from 
27, at 72.  
 48. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 72; see also BURDA, supra note 28, at 5–7. 
 49. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. at 1521 (finding that the economy would be 
improved by “an absence of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status”). 
 50. See S. Rep. No. 94-589 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 405 (“[T]his 
bill identifies characteristics of applicants which the Committee believes are, and must be, 
irrelevant to a credit judgment, and prohibits or curtails their use.”).  
 51. See BURDA, supra note 28, at 5. 
 52. See James P. Nehf, A Legislative Framework for Reducing Fraud in the Credit 
Repair Industry, 70 N.C. L. REV. 781, 783–87 (1992) (discussing problems arising from the 
operation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)); Credit Repair?  Buyer Beware!, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 5, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/03/eraser.shtm [hereinafter 
Buyer Beware] (discussing the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) “Operation Eraser,” 
aimed at cracking down on the predatory practices of credit repair organizations). 
 53. See 134 CONG. REC. 21,394–95 (1988); see also Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., The 
Credit Repair Organization Act:  The “Next Big Thing?”, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 49, 
49 (2003) (“Consumer concern over the negative impact of adverse credit ratings has given 
birth to a new industry . . . . [that] offer[s] seemingly quick and easy ways for subprime 
consumers to ‘repair’ their credit.”). 
 54. One organization advertises on its website that “[o]ur typical customer sees an 
increase of 40–50 points in his or her credit score in just over a month.” 
CREDITREPAIRCLINIC.COM, http://www.creditrepairclinic.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
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the consumer’s file.55  Because of the damaging effect of a negative credit 
report on an individual,56 consumers reacted positively to the ability to 
“establish . . . . positive credit.”57  The success of these enterprises flows 
from the quantity of business obtained:  the companies “inundat[e] 
consumer reporting agencies with so many challenges to consumer reports 
that the reinvestigation system breaks down, and the adverse, but accurate, 
information is deleted.”58  This approach does not have a high success rate, 
so credit repair clinics often obtain fees from consumers without having any 
impact on the client’s credit report.59  Thus, credit repair organizations 
profit whether successful or not and do so by collecting fees charged to 
those already in weak financial straits.60
2.  Passage of the Credit Repair Organizations Act 
 
To combat this problem, Congress passed the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act as Title IV of the Omnibus Consumer Credit Protection 
Act in 1996, which took effect on April 1, 1997.61  The CROA’s legislative 
history reveals that its main goal is information dissemination.62  
Supporters of the bill frequently expounded on the harm posed to 
consumers by credit repair clinics,63
 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006).  Section 1681i(a)(5)(A) requires credit 
reporting agencies to delete the information that cannot be verified after a reasonable 
reinvestigation and then to notify the consumer of the modification in her credit report. See 
also supra Part I.A.2. 
 as well as the extreme importance of 
 56. See Kelley et al., supra note 53, at 49 (“‘Bad credit,’ which may result from a variety 
of sources, including unemployment, divorce, illness, a lack of financial discipline, or simply 
‘too many’ bills, often seems an insurmountable roadblock for individuals seeking to do 
anything from purchasing a car to refinancing their home.”). 
 57. DSISOLUTIONS, http://www.repairyourbadcredit.com/ourservice.htm (last visited Apr. 
20, 2011).  
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 103-486, at 57 (1994). 
 59. In one notable case, 9000 people lost $2 million to one credit repair clinic in New 
Jersey.  The clinic charged customers up to $2000 in exchange for a promise to remove 
unfavorable credit information from the individual’s files.  After obtaining payment from 
customers, the company did nothing to clear the clients’ credit histories or extend their 
available credit. See Sloane, supra note 43; see also John L. Ropiequet & Jason B. Hirsh, 
The Credit Repair Organizations Act:  Recent Developments, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 
13, 13 (2010) (“[W]hile some credit repair organizations genuinely seek to help cure poor 
credit scores, others may victimize consumers by making fantastic and baseless promises 
that any type of bad credit can be legally repaired, for a price.”). 
 60. See 136 CONG. REC. 18,766 (1990) (“[Credit repair organizations] prey on 
consumers whose dreams of a better life and desperate situation make them susceptible to 
the false promises of unscrupulous credit repair operators.”); Kelley et al., supra note 53, at 
49 (referring to those who utilize credit repair organizations as “unsophisticated and 
financially vulnerable”); Sloane, supra note 43 (describing credit repair clinics as “profit-
making ventures that, by their very nature, often operate at the edge of the law, thwarting the 
maintenance of orderly credit records [o]n behalf of clients who have bad credit histories”). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 62. See H.R. REP. No. 103-486, at 57 (1994) (“This title seeks . . . to ensure that 
consumers are provided with necessary information about credit repair organizations so that 
they can make informed decisions regarding the purchase of their services . . . .”). 
 63. See 136 CONG. REC. 18,766 (1990) (“[T]he only thing that most credit repair clinics 
clean out are consumers’ checkbooks.”). 
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an individual’s credit history in today’s society.64  The legislative history of 
the CROA manifests a desire to stop the frequent offers by credit repair 
organizations to “fix” unfixable credit histories and to make consumers 
more aware of the limitations of credit repair organizations.65
The legislative history of the CROA suggests that credit repair 
organizations bring little value to the credit reporting industry and also 
conveys a strong impression that those enacting the CROA believed that 
credit repair organizations pose a greater threat than they are worth.
 
66  
Indeed, even the former owner of a credit repair clinic has acknowledged 
the misconduct of his previous business.67
C.  Shelter from Harmful Repair:  The CROA 
 
This section provides an examination of the CROA and the different 
forms of consumer protection that the statute offers.  The CROA begins by 
discussing the type of entity that is considered a credit repair organization.68  
It then delineates the disclosures it requires, outlines the requirements it 
imposes on contract formation, and explains the consumer’s right to cancel 
a contract.69  Finally the CROA describes the effect of contracts or 
agreements not in compliance with the CROA, civil liability for violations 
of the Act, administrative enforcement of the CROA, the statute of 
limitations, and the CROA’s relation to state law.70  The FTC, state 
attorneys general, or private citizens who have been misled by a credit 
repair organization may enforce the CROA.71
 
 64. See id. (“Credit is the lifeblood of the American consumer society. . . . A poor credit 
history is the ‘Scarlet Letter’ of 20th century America.”). 
 
 65. See 140 CONG. REC. 8,999 (1994) (statement of Sen. Reigle) (“[T]he representations 
of these so-called credit doctors prove misleading, deceiving consumers into paying higher 
fees or causing credit bureaus to waste time and money on spurious disputes.”); 136 CONG. 
REC. 18,766 (1990) (“Credit repair organizations hold out the promise of a quick credit fix at 
a high cash price.”); id. at 3,821 (referring to the legislation as “critically needed” to help 
protect consumers from credit repair organizations.). 
 66. See Buyer Beware, supra note 52 (“The FTC has never seen a legitimate credit 
repair company.”). 
 67. See Credit Repair Organizations Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Affairs and Coinage of the Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 18 
(1988) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey Roberts) (“In my opinion, there is no such 
thing as credit repair, so instead of being regulated, the industry should be outlawed.  If not, 
the regulation should be so tough and the bond so high that people are discouraged from 
going into the business.”); see also Sloane, supra note 43 (“Credit-repair clinics . . . operate 
at the edge of the law . . . .”). 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). 
 69. See id. §§ 1679b–e. 
 70. See id. §§ 1679f–j. 
 71. See id. § 1679h; Kelley et al., supra note 53, at 52. 
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1.  What a Credit Repair Organization Is 
The exact definition of a credit repair organization is vague.72  As 
defined by the CROA, a credit repair organization is an organization 
dealing in interstate commerce that accepts money in exchange for 
“improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or 
. . . providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any 
activity or service described” elsewhere in the statute.73  The CROA 
specifically exempts certain entities.74
Courts have grappled with the issue of whether certain types of 
professionals, including attorneys and banks, fall within the ambit of the 
CROA when these entities provide credit counseling services.
 
75  The U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California found that an attorney 
fell within the definition of a credit repair organization when he issued 
advertisements saying “BAD CREDIT REPORT . . . Improve Your Credit 
Score Now!”76  Although the attorney argued that in dealings with the 
client, he acted as a lawyer and not as a credit repair organization, the court 
held that because he performed services with the intention of improving the 
client’s credit rating, the CROA encompassed his actions.77
2.  What a Credit Repair Organization Does 
 
A business that meets the statutory definition of a credit repair 
organization comes within the ambit of the CROA only if it engages in 
certain conduct specified in the CROA.78  Actions that constitute offering a 
service under the CROA must relate to improving a consumer’s “credit 
record, credit history, or credit rating.”79  The parameters of this provision 
are rather broad.80  Courts assessing whether or not an entity provided 
services as intended under the CROA look to representations that the entity 
has made to its clients.81
 
 72. In clarifying the definition of a credit repair organization, one court has analogized 
these clinics to “a person who offers to improve a golfer’s score after a round is over by . . . 
making changes to the golfer’s scorecard . . . . By contrast, a person who offers to give a 
golfer swing tips to improve his score . . . is not a CRO.” See Hillis v. Equifax Consumer 
Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 514 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
  For example, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia held that an online credit guide, which 
 73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). 
 74. See id. § 1679a(3)(B)(i)–(iii) (exempting, for example, nonprofit organizations, 
depository institutions, and government credit unions). 
 75. See, e.g., Rannis v. Fair Credit Lawyers, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 76. See id. at 1114–15. 
 77. Id. at 1115. 
 78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 79. Id. § 1679a(3)(A)(i). 
 80. See, e.g., Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 511 (N.D. Ga. 
2006) (finding the CROA’s definition of a credit repair organization “sweeping”). 
 81. See Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Proof of Claim Involving Violation of Credit Repair 
Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1679 et seq., or Similar State Enactment, 111 AM. JUR. 3D 
Proof of Facts § 4 (2010).  
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defendants sought to define as a product, constituted a service subject to the 
CROA.82  Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
determined that a company offering an analysis of credit reports designed to 
improve customers’ credit offered a service that fell within the CROA.83
3.  Substantive Violations of the CROA 
 
The CROA sets forth four substantive actions that render an entity liable 
for violations of the CROA.84  Section 1679b(a)(1) prohibits the making of 
untrue or misleading statements about a consumer’s credit standing or 
credit capacity to a consumer reporting agency or to anyone who has 
extended credit to the consumer or from whom the consumer seeks an 
extension of credit.85  Misleading statements to an organization not 
providing credit to the client-consumer, however, do not fall under the 
CROA.86
Next, section 1679b(a)(2) makes it illegal to alter information about a 
consumer’s identity and to conceal adverse information about a consumer’s 
creditworthiness.
 
87  This section includes counseling or advising a 
consumer to make a statement intended to prevent accurate reporting of the 
consumer’s credit record as an aspect of the prohibition.88  Section 
1679b(a)(3) prohibits making misleading representations of the services of 
which a credit repair organization is capable.89  Similarly, any practice that 
constitutes fraud on any person involved in the offer or sale of the services 
of a credit repair organization violates the CROA pursuant to section 
1679b(a)(4).90
4.  Technical Violations of the CROA 
 
Failure to follow the technical requirements of the CROA constitutes a 
violation of the Act, regardless of whether the credit repair organization 
engaged in fraudulent behavior or committed any substantive violation of 
the CROA.91  These technical conditions require that agreements with 
consumers be in the form of a written contract.92
 
 82. See Hillis, 237 F.R.D. at 509–10. 
  The contract must include 
 83. See In re Nat’l Credit Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 21 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(“Although the Defendants do not provide services to repair credit histories, they do 
represent that they will perform services, monitor, and provide advice to assist consumers 
[with] improv[ing] their credit ratings.”). 
 84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679b. 
 85. Id. § 1679b(a)(1). 
 86. See Whitley v. Taylor Bean & Whitacker Mortg. Corp., 607 F. Supp. 2d 885, 899 
(N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1679b(a)(2). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 1679b(a)(3). 
 90. Id. § 1679b(a)(4). 
 91. See id. §§ 1679c–d. 
 92. See id. § 1679d(a). 
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the terms of payment and the services to be provided.93  Additionally, the 
CROA requires that a specific written disclosure be made to consumers 
prior to the formation of an agreement.94  Credit repair organizations must 
provide this disclosure as a document separate from the contract,95 and the 
organization must retain the consumer’s signed acknowledgement of receipt 
of the disclosure.96  The CROA explicitly provides that these requirements 
cannot be waived.97
D.  Local Protection:  Similar State Enactments 
 
Several states have enacted legislation to serve the same purposes as the 
CROA under the auspices of state law.98
Several states have deemed violations of the state law regulating credit 
repair organizations a criminal offense.
  These statutes represent some of 
the more unique and noteworthy approaches to protecting consumers from 
credit repair organizations.  An examination of these statutes reveals an 
effort to provide consumers with information and to penalize credit repair 
organizations for misconduct. 
99  These statutes provide that 
violations of the statute constitute a misdemeanor, and some classify repeat 
offenses as a felony.100  Notably, Georgia’s relevant statute makes any 
operation of a credit repair organization whatsoever a misdemeanor.101  
Several states make an organization’s failure to post bond a violation of the 
statute.102  Another common provision in state statutes requires credit repair 
organizations to register with the state before conducting business.103
Many state statutes provide for injunctive relief against a credit repair 
clinic.
 
104
 
 93. See id. § 1679d(b). 
  Some states place the burden of proof on the defendant to prove 
 94. See id. § 1679c(a).  The aspect of the disclosure requirements most pertinent to this 
Note is the portion stating that “[y]ou have the right to sue a credit repair organization that 
violates” the CROA. Id.  The only time a “right to sue” is mentioned in the statute is in this 
required disclosures section. Id. 
 95. See id. § 1679c(b). 
 96. Id. § 1679c(c). 
 97. Id. § 1679f. 
 98. See Parker, supra note 81, at 237. 
 99. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-91-104 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.5-
110 (West 2010); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/13 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 538A.12 (West 
1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1113 (West 1994). 
 100. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/13 (“Upon conviction of a second or subsequent 
offense the violator is guilty of a . . . felony.”). 
 101. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59 (2007).  The statute provides that any organization that 
seeks to improve a buyer’s credit history, to obtain an extension of credit, or to provide 
advice on the aforementioned subjects is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. § 16-9-59(c).  The 
statute exempts several professionals from the statute, however, including real estate brokers, 
attorneys, and consumer reporting agencies. Id. § 16-9-59(a)(2)(B)(iv)–(vii). 
 102. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1703 (2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 538A.4; KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-1104. 
 103. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.25 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2404 
(2010). 
 104. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 538A.10; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1110.  
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exemption from the statute,105 and some explicitly restrict the amount of 
fees an organization qualifying under the statute can charge.106  
Oklahoma’s statute entitles the Administrator of Consumer Credit to free 
access to inspect a credit repair organization’s books and records.107  Puerto 
Rico’s statute requires any individual operating a credit repair service to 
have certain credentials,108 and bars credit repair services from transferring 
funds without prior authorization from the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions.109  Several of these statutes contain disclosure requirements 
mirroring that of the CROA, including the required disclosure that 
individuals have “a right to sue.”110
II.  THE PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, AND 
HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS SHAPED ARBITRATION 
  These statutes reflect an awareness by 
state legislators that the danger inherent in the operation of credit repair 
organizations requires stringent rules to prevent wrongdoing. 
This part first discusses the origins and various forms of alternative 
dispute resolution.  It then examines the practice of arbitration and analyzes 
the significant body of case law regarding arbitration that has developed 
since the passage of the FAA. 
A.  Beyond the Courthouse:  The Origins and Objectives of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a term that encompasses several 
methods of conflict resolution,111 many of which have been used for 
centuries.112  Evidence of the usage of negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration in ancient times abounds.113  In addition to these roots, interest 
in ADR has burgeoned in recent years.114
 
 105. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.19. 
  Since the 1960s, usage, 
 106. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1105. 
 107. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 146 (West 1998). 
 108. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 7, § 630e (2006) (“Any [credit repair agent] shall have a 
bachelor’s degree and two . . . years of experience in the area of credit granting and analysis 
with a financial institution or five . . . years of experience in said market if he/she lacks the 
bachelor’s degree.”). 
 109. See id. § 630n. 
 110. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.15. 
 111. See OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL:  DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT 95 (2005) (“In the United States [Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)] has included a potpourri of processes . . . . Although alike in that they do not 
contemplate a judicial determination of a dispute, these are very different processes . . . .”). 
 112. See JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION XXV, 1–18 (2004) (identifying 1800 B.C. as the first instance of the 
practice of mediation and arbitration). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 2–18 (describing the usage of ADR in ancient societies, including 
Confucius’s use of mediation in China in 500 B.C. and Ancient Greek arbitration in 400 
B.C.). 
 114. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:  REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 3 (1992) (“ADR . . . has for a number of years 
been one of the hottest of all hot topics in the legal academy.  As with each new generation 
2011] GIVING ARBITRATION SOME CREDIT 2775 
 
discussion, and criticism of ADR within the U.S. legal system have 
intensified.115
The central premise of ADR emerges from the limitations inherent in the 
litigation process.
 
116  The common thread among all ADR methods is an 
effort to avoid the delay, expense, and rigidity of litigation.117  These 
methods fall along a spectrum of varying formality and compulsion.118  
Negotiation combines elements of informality and privacy that are not 
available in a traditional trial,119 mediation involves a third-party neutral 
moderator but entrusts a final decision to the parties themselves,120 and 
arbitration involves the use of a private third party neutral who renders an 
award that is typically binding.121  Falling in between these three methods 
on the ADR spectrum are hybrid methods including, for example, the mini-
trial,122 Med-Arb,123 bracketed arbitration,124 and facilitative mediation.125
The widespread use of these methods has strongly impacted traditional 
litigation over the past forty years.
 
126
 
and sex, so too this academic generation and ADR:  it thinks it discovered the whole thing.  
Like sex, however, ADR is as old as humanity itself, and the academic ADR movement is 
largely one of rediscovery by the academy.”). 
  ADR methods are now used in 
 115. See JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES:  THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 5 
(2005) (discussing societal forces that led to the increased use of ADR, including new 
legislation, increased prosecution of drug crimes, and numerous domestic relations case 
filings). 
 116. See id. at 2–7, 19. 
 117. See id. at 5. 
 118. See id. at 3. 
 119. See id. at 19 (describing negotiation as a “process of communication used to get 
something we want when another person has control over whether or how we can get it”). 
 120. See id. at 223 (“Mediation . . . involves the participation of an impartial third  
party. . . . [I]t is consensual, informal, and usually private:  The participants need not reach 
agreement, and the mediator has no power to impose an outcome.”). 
 121. See id. at 453. 
 122. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, 
AND OTHER PROCESSES 230 (2d ed. 1992).  A mini-trial is a process in which neutral advisors 
and executives hear presentations by each party and negotiate a resolution. Id. 
 123. In Med-Arb, a third party serves as a mediator initially, switching gears into the role 
of an arbitrator issuing a binding decision should mediation fail during the process. See id. at 
226; see also FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 647 (describing Arb-Med, a process by 
which a neutral third party acts as an arbitrator until she has decided upon an award, at which 
point the award is sealed and she can engage in mediation between the parties, with the 
sealed award serving as a last resort should mediation fail). 
 124. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 496.  Bracketed arbitration is a process in 
which the parties identify a range of recovery prior to arbitration, and the arbitrator’s 
decision is binding only in the event that it falls within this range. Id. 
 125. See id. at 4, Fig. 1.1; see also ADR Glossary, JAMS:  THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, 
http://www.jamsadr.com/adr-glossary (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (describing facilitative 
mediation as a process whereby the parties largely control the outcome and the mediator 
simply enhances communication and information exchange between the parties). 
 126. See Courtroom Use:  Access to Justice, Effective Judicial Administration, and 
Courtroom Security:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 72 (2010) [hereinafter Resnik Testimony] 
(statement of Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law School) (noting that the 20th century began 
with 30,000 federal cases pending, ended with 300,000 cases pending, and although the 
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business, family, “toxic tort, farmer-lender, and doctor-patient” disputes, to 
name a few.127  In 1998, Congress passed the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act, requiring federal district courts to utilize some form of 
ADR program in all civil actions.128  While the number of cases filed in 
court has increased, the number of cases tried has drastically decreased, 
leading some scholars to deliberate over the benefits and disadvantages of 
“the vanishing trial” on our legal system.129
B.  “The Most Venerable ADR Mechanism”:  Arbitration in Practice 
 
Arbitration sits closest to a formal trial on the spectrum of dispute 
resolution processes.130  Broadly, arbitration is “any process in which a 
private third party neutral renders a judgment, or ‘award,’ regarding a 
dispute after hearing evidence and argument, like a judge.”131  A wide array 
of practices can be characterized as arbitration.132  This Note is primarily 
concerned with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration,133
 
Long Range Plan of the Federal Courts anticipated that by 2010 this number would exceed 
600,000, the number has stayed near 350,000). 
 in which parties agree 
 127. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 122, at 10; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer 
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 129 (Edward 
Brunet et al. eds., 2006) (“Arbitration has even been mandated in connection with games 
sponsored by the McDonald’s hamburger chain and with respect to a mail-in on a Cheerios 
cereal box.”). 
 128. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2006).  This statute joins several ADR statutes passed by 
Congress in the last thirty years requiring various branches of government to institute ADR 
programs. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584 (2006) 
(requiring administrative agencies to utilize ADR); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (requiring district courts to devise programs that will lead to reduced 
costs and delay within four years); Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) 
(authorizing certain federal district courts to employ arbitration referral programs); Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (encouraging the creation of ADR 
mechanisms in state and local governments). 
 129. See James E. McGuire, Some Questions About “The Vanishing Trial”, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Winter 2004, at 17 (“[O]nly where important interests or needs are not being met 
should we look for solutions to the ‘vanishing trial.’”). But see Resnik Testimony, supra note 
126, at 84 (“[P]ublic adjudicatory procedures make important contributions to functioning 
democracies.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:  How the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement is Reshaping our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 196–97 
(2003) (“[T]he visible presence of institutionalized and legitimized conflict, channeled 
productively, teaches citizens that it is not always better to compromise and accept the status 
quo because, sometimes, great gains are to be had by peaceful contest.”). 
 130. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 4. 
 131. Id. at 453; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
arbitration as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties 
who are usu[ally] agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding”). 
 132. Indeed, one scholar has even suggested that Virgil’s Aeneid is a tale of “arbitration 
gone awry.” BARRETT, supra note 112, at 6–7. 
 133. Even the moniker given to this form of arbitration is debated. See Stephen J. Ware, 
Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 
38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 41 (2003) (“What [some call] mandatory arbitration is better called 
contractual arbitration because . . . [a]rbitration is not mandatory when it arises out of a 
contract, because contracts are formed voluntarily. . . . In the absence of duress, it is 
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to arbitrate prior to entering into, or as part of, an agreement.134  
Traditionally, the hallmarks of arbitration are its binding nature and its 
adversarial quality.135  Parties choose arbitration over other forms of 
dispute resolution because arbitration affords a speedy, less expensive, and 
more confidential resolution of disputes.136  Additionally, because 
arbitration is held in private and arbitrators need not issue written decisions, 
no precedent results from arbitration proceedings.137
Arbitration may come about either as a result of a prior agreement to 
arbitrate or as a court-ordered process.
 
138  Some courts139 now require 
arbitration of certain kinds of disputes before those claims proceed to 
litigation.140  Most arbitrations occur under the auspices of one of several 
arbitration associations.141  These organizations promulgate procedures, 
rules, and limitations that govern arbitration proceedings.142  Many pre-
dispute arbitration agreements include a reference to which association will 
govern the dispute.143  When parties have signed a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement, upon the development of a dispute, one party may initiate 
proceedings, the parties will select an arbitrator, and the process will 
proceed.144
When a party has filed suit despite the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, a court usually takes four steps in determining whether to order 
 
 
inaccurate, as well as overly dramatic, to say that a contract containing an arbitration clause 
results in arbitration that is involuntary or mandatory.”). 
 134. See LAURIE S. COLTRI, CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 431, tbl. 19-1 (2004) (describing the different forms of arbitration by means of 
a diagram). 
 135. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 453. 
 136. See id.; see also CHASE, supra note 111, at 95 (“Arbitration has often been embraced 
by business interests for its supposed cost savings over adjudication, because the results can 
be shielded from public exposure, and because of its reliance on decision makers 
knowledgeable about the type of dispute to be resolved.”). 
 137. See CHASE, supra note 111, at 95; see also Alderman, supra note 17, at 155 (“[M]ost 
decisions of arbitrators are secret, and are often not even accompanied by a written opinion.  
Even when published and made available to the public, the decision of one arbitrator . . . is in 
no way binding on any other arbitrator or panel.”). 
 138. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 464. 
 139. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
 140. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 464 (mentioning medical malpractice claims 
and suits involving less than $50,000 in damages as examples of suits that courts require to 
be arbitrated prior to the commencement of formal litigation proceedings); see also Wayne 
D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Non-Binding ADR Services?, 16 ALTERNATIVES 65, 75 
(1998) (pointing to the importance of relationship building, as well as the provision of 
mechanisms for less affluent plaintiffs to vindicate claims, as reasons for court-annexed 
ADR services). 
 141. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 466. 
 142. See id. (“[T]here are literally dozens of different arbitration rules for different trade 
groups or practice areas . . . .”); Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2011); JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses:  
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS:  THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, 
http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).  
 143. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 115, at 466. 
 144. See id. at 467. 
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arbitration.145  The court first decides if the parties formed an agreement to 
arbitrate.146  If an agreement exists, the court then examines the scope of 
that agreement.147  Next, the court determines, in the case of federal 
statutory claims, if Congress intended these claims to be resolved solely in 
litigation.148  Finally, the court decides whether to stay the remainder of the 
proceedings pending arbitration if it decides that not all the claims are 
arbitrable.149
Under the FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated only in a narrow set 
of circumstances.
 
150  Arbitrators have extensive discretion, do not need to 
explain decisions, and do not make findings of fact.151  Vacatur of an 
arbitrator’s award is granted only if one of four statutory grounds are met:  
the award reflects fraud; clear bias on the part of the arbitrator; procedural 
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator; or that the arbitrators have 
“exceeded their powers, or . . . imperfectly executed them.”152
C.  The Evolution of Arbitration Jurisprudence 
 
1.  Early Arbitration Agreements in the Courts 
Arbitration as a method of conflict resolution has a long and fraught 
history.  Some of the first known arbitrators and users of arbitration include 
King Solomon,153 Philip II of Macedonia,154 and George Washington.155  
Despite these esteemed origins, arbitration has not always been treated as 
the “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable”156
 
 145. Several circuits adhere to this four-part test. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 
F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2008); Glazer v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 
2005).  The test is taken from language within Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 proceeding that most courts 
consider it today.  English courts did not hesitate to invalidate arbitration 
 146. See Glazer, 394 F.3d at 451. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); see also infra Part II.C.5. 
 151. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 48–51 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 152. 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 153. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:  THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN 
EMPLOYMENT 5 n.30 (1997) (citing a verse of the King James Bible in which Solomon uses 
arbitration to resolve a conflict over the motherhood of a baby). 
 154. See id. at 5 (“Philip II of Macedonia, the father of Alexander the Great, specified the 
use of arbitration in disputes arising under his peace treaty with the city-states of southern 
Greece.”). 
 155. See id. (“George Washington provided that any disputes concerning his intentions in 
his will would be resolved by a panel of three arbitrators, and that the decision of those 
arbitrations would be ‘as binding on the Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court 
of the United States.’”); see also BARRETT, supra note 112, at 46 (excerpting Washington’s 
will). 
 156. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also BALES, supra note 153, at 4 (“[F]inality distinguishes 
arbitration from mediation . . . . Arbitration ends the dispute.”). 
2011] GIVING ARBITRATION SOME CREDIT 2779 
 
agreements into which parties had entered.157  Moreover, courts often 
rescinded the authority given to arbitrators and at most granted only 
nominal damages for breach of an agreement to arbitrate.158  Commentators 
and courts have explained this entrenched hostility toward arbitration as 
stemming from a belief that arbitration was ineffective when 
unsupervised.159  There is some evidence, however, that English courts 
were concerned about losing money and business if arbitration became too 
popular and caused courts to be used less frequently.160  An English statute 
passed by Parliament in 1889 led to increased enforcement of arbitration 
awards in English courts.161  American courts, however, continued to treat 
arbitration agreements as suspect.162  A brief period of time followed 
during which courts invalidated arbitration agreements but did so 
reluctantly.163
2.  Arbitration Is Federalized:  The Passage of the Federal Arbitration Act 
 
In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act “[t]o make 
valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of 
disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce 
among the States or Territories or with foreign nations.”164  While the 
passage of this Act was generally lauded in the legal community,165
 
 157. See Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) (stating that “the agreement of 
the parties cannot oust this Court”). 
 some 
were hesitant about the benefits of using arbitration in a broader array of 
 158. See Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 
604–05 (1928). 
 159. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d 
Cir. 1942). 
 160. See id. at 983 n.14 (quoting Lord Campbell as saying “the emoluments of the Judges 
depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salaries, there was 
great competition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westminster Hall . . . for the 
division of the spoil”). 
 161. See Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49 (Eng.).  The Act required courts to 
enforce arbitration. See BALES, supra note 153, at 16; see also Austrian Lloyd S.S. Co. v. 
Gresham Life Assurance Soc’y, Ltd., [1903] 1 K.B. 249 (holding that an agreement to 
arbitrate was enforceable). 
 162. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 458 (1874) (holding that a state 
statute enacted to enforce arbitration agreements “is repugnant to the Constitution of the 
United States . . . and is illegal and void”). 
 163. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1012 
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (“[T]he Supreme Court has laid down the rule that such a complete ouster 
of jurisdiction . . . is void in a federal forum. . . . Inferior courts may fail to find convincing 
reasons for it; but the rule must be obeyed.”). 
 164. 43 Stat. 883 (1925). 
 165. See Arbitration May Cure Law’s Delay and Result in More Exact Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1923, at X15. 
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disputes.166  Nevertheless, in 1947, this statute was reenacted and codified 
as the Federal Arbitration Act.167
The FAA makes enforceable written arbitration agreements,
 
168 
specifically including maritime and interstate commerce transactions while 
expressly excluding “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”169  The FAA sets out two methods by which agreements to 
arbitrate may be enforced.  Section 3 provides that federal courts may issue 
stays of proceedings when an issue falls within the bounds of an arbitration 
agreement.170  Section 4 provides that federal courts may issue orders 
compelling arbitration should a party to an arbitration agreement refuse to 
submit the issue to arbitration.171
A federal court may make these determinations only if a federal question 
is at issue or the parties meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.
 
172  
Yet parties that do not meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction173 do 
not face a different body of arbitration law.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that the FAA preempts any state law that may be 
inconsistent with the federal statute’s provisions or purposes.174
3.  An Initial Rejection 
 
Congress’s passage and reenactment of the FAA evidenced an increased 
approval of arbitration.  Yet the Supreme Court’s first decision after the 
passage of the FAA concerning the enforceability of an arbitration clause 
reflected a step back from the expected liberal endorsement of arbitration.  
In Wilko v. Swan,175
 
 166. See Arbitration is Not Always Best—Though Correct in Principle, It Has Numerous 
Pitfalls for Unwary Importers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1924, at E10.  The article argues that 
arbitration, while beneficial in some areas of conflict, is an inadequate method of conflict 
resolution for certain types of disputes. See id. 
 the Supreme Court considered a clash created by what 
it viewed as two conflicting policies:  the FAA and the Securities Act of 
 167. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).  One author has described arbitration as particularly well 
suited to American culture because it “involves a competitive process of dispute resolution, 
yet it allows disputants to resolve their differences outside the legal system.” See COLTRI, 
supra note 134, at 426. 
 168. See BALES, supra note 153, at 17 (“The FAA creates a body of federal substantive 
law permitting judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in connection with commerce 
and maritime transactions.”). 
 169. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 170. Id. § 3. 
 171. Id. § 4. 
 172. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 
(1983) (“[The Arbitration Act] creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent 
federal-question jurisdiction.”). 
 173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 174. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive 
or procedural policies to the contrary.”); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 
(1984) (holding that the FAA preempts inconsistent state arbitration laws). 
 175. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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1933.176  After the plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, the defendant moved to stay the 
proceedings pursuant to section 3 of the FAA and submit the claims to 
arbitration.177  The district court denied the motion,178 and a divided U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.179
The conflict arose from a provision of the Securities Act voiding any 
waiver of rights granted to consumers by the Act.
 
180  The plaintiff argued 
that an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy constituted a waiver of 
compliance with the Act, because of language in the Act declaring that 
“[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
offenses and violations under this subchapter.”181
Additionally, the Act provided that for claims brought in federal court, 
“the purchaser has a wide choice of venue, the privilege of nation-wide 
service of process and the jurisdictional $3,000 requirement of diversity 
cases is inapplicable.”
 
182  The plaintiff argued that these provisions of the 
Act indicated that Congress sought to ensure that the right of buyers to 
recover not be weakened, and that arbitration would not vindicate his rights 
as certainly as would a judicial forum.183  The defendant argued that there 
was no conflict between the Securities Act and the FAA because 
“arbitration is merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law.”184
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the plaintiff.
 
185  The Court 
found that the Securities Act was primarily concerned with protecting 
buyers from certain disadvantages inherent in transactions, and that the 
rights bestowed upon the plaintiff by the Securities Act are less effectively 
vindicated in arbitration.186
 
 176. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2006).  It is a violation under the Securities Act of 1933 to 
sell a security by means of fraud.  The plaintiff in this case alleged that the seller 
misrepresented the value of the stock being sold. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. 
  The unequal bargaining positions of the parties 
 177. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. 
 178. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (finding that “arbitration of 
the issues at bar is [not] consistent with the policy and language as expressed by Congress in 
the Securities Act”). 
 179. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953) (“[W]e do not find in the 
purpose or in the language of the statute, any policy argument strong enough to override the 
policy of the Arbitration Act.”). 
 180. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person 
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter . . . shall 
be void.”). 
 181. Id. § 77v. 
 182. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. 
 183. See id. at 432. 
 184. Id. at 433. 
 185. See id. at 434–35 (“This arrangement to arbitrate is a ‘stipulation,’ and we think the 
right to select the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be waived under 
section 14 of the Securities Act.”). 
 186. See id. 
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and the consequences of waiving a right to a judicial forum played 
significant roles in the Court’s ultimate decision.187
The Wilko decision came to stand for the proposition that if a “pervasive 
public interest” was at stake, arbitration agreements should not be 
enforced.
 
188  After the Supreme Court decided Wilko, lower courts 
generally decided cases upon the premise that arbitration was an inadequate 
form of conflict resolution.189  Despite the passage of the FAA, judicial 
hostility toward arbitration remained a governing theory, particularly in 
terms of the arbitration of statutory claims.190
4.  “A Healthy Regard” for Arbitration 
 
Eventually the rationale of the FAA, that arbitration is an adequate forum 
for the vindication of statutory rights, prevailed in court.  In 1985, the 
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.191 held that arbitration was an adequate method for resolution of claims 
arising under the Sherman Act.192  Writing for the majority, Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun adhered to the common law contractual policy of giving force 
to the intentions of parties193 and held that the existence of a statute upon 
which claims were predicated did not change this principle.194  Blackmun 
did, however, caution against ignoring legitimate reasons for the 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement, and the Court did not formally 
overturn Wilko.195
 
 187. See id. at 435 (“When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, 
waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in other business 
transactions.”). 
  The proposition that emerged from Mitsubishi, as 
applied by lower courts, was that parties to an arbitration agreement would 
be required to arbitrate “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to 
 188. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (2d Cir. 
1968); see also BALES, supra note 153, at 19 (stating that the public policy defense created 
in Wilko presumed that “(1) a judicial forum was superior to arbitration for enforcing 
statutory rights; (2) compulsory arbitration constituted a waiver of the statutory right to a 
judicial forum, which contravened public policy; and (3) the informality of arbitration made 
it difficult for courts to correct errors in statutory interpretation”). 
 189. See, e.g., Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 190. In addition to Wilko, the Supreme Court decided three cases in which it found that in 
enacting certain statutes, Congress did not intend the protections afforded by the statute to be 
administered by a private arbitrator. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 
(1984) (holding that claims under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 should not be arbitrated); 
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards 
Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974) (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). 
 191. 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985). 
 192. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).  
 193. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 (calling the FAA “at bottom a policy guaranteeing the 
enforcement of private contractual arrangements”). 
 194. See id. at 626–27 (“[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the 
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the 
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”). 
 195. See id. at 627. 
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preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”196  
The principle announced by the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v Mercury Construction Corp.197 two years earlier, that “questions of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration,”198 was, for the first time, expanded to reach claims 
based on federal statutes as well.199
After upholding an agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the 
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 1987,
 
200 the 
Court expressly overruled Wilko v. Swan in 1989.201  Writing for a 5-4 
majority, Justice Kennedy wrote, “To the extent that Wilko rested on 
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded 
in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step 
with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this 
method of resolving disputes.”202  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that arbitration proceedings force participants to forgo substantive 
rights afforded by the statute upon which they bring their claim,203 and 
noted that the enforcement of arbitration agreements produces a result by 
which both the policies of the FAA and the relevant statute are 
implemented.204  With this decision, the Court’s approach to arbitration 
became one of deference and enforcement.205
In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Supreme Court 
further considered the FAA’s reach in analyzing whether the FAA applied 
to a contract containing a mandatory arbitration agreement between an 
Alabama homeowner and the local office of the Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Companies.
 
206  The plaintiff argued that the agreement fell within the scope 
of an Alabama statute providing that written pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements are invalid and unenforceable.207
 
 196. Id. at 628. 
  The Supreme Court of 
Alabama agreed with the plaintiff, finding that although the FAA preempts 
 197. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  
 198. Id. at 24. 
 199. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625–26. 
 200. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).  The claims in 
this case were predicated on both the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006), and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006). McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222.  This case also marked the first 
time that the Supreme Court found claims arising under statutory rights to be arbitrable in a 
domestic context. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 951 (1999). 
 201. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
 202. Id. at 481. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 485. 
 205. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674 (1996). 
 206. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995). 
 207. See id. 
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conflicting state law, the FAA did not apply to the contract at hand because 
the contract did not concern interstate commerce.208
The Court reversed, finding that even if the parties did not intend the 
contract to have a connection to interstate commerce, the transaction need 
only “in fact involve interstate commerce” to be within the reach of the 
FAA.
 
209  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that the term 
“involving commerce” in section 2 of the FAA “signals an intent to 
exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.”210  With this holding, the 
Court brought any transaction with connections to interstate commerce 
within the scope of the FAA.  In addition, Justice Breyer, in dicta, extolled 
the virtues of arbitration in the realm of consumer protection.211  He 
rejected the view espoused by an amicus curiae brief that disallowing 
arbitration would more adequately protect the interests of consumers 
signing form contracts, and instead found that “arbitration’s advantages 
often would seem helpful to individuals . . . who need a less expensive 
alternative to litigation.”212  This remark evinces the complete shift in the 
Court’s approach to arbitration since the period following the passage of the 
FAA, when the Court’s position was that, despite the passage of the Act, 
arbitration inadequately shielded consumers from unfair business 
practices.213
In another purported collision between the FAA and statutory rights, the 
Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
 
214 held that 
claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
were subject to mandatory arbitration.215  Gilmer, a signatory to an 
employment agreement providing for arbitration of future controversies 
with the employer, was fired at the age of sixty-two, and argued primarily 
that mandatory arbitration would both impede the important social policies 
behind the ADEA and deprive him of a right to a judicial forum guaranteed 
under the ADEA.216
The Court rejected both of these contentions.
 
217
 
 208. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 356 (1993) (“[T]he 
evidence adduced by the Terminix companies does not establish that the parties 
contemplated substantial interstate activity when they entered the termite bond.”). 
  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Byron R. White found that arbitration of Gilmer’s claims 
would just as adequately enforce the policies for which the ADEA was 
 209. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 279.  The transaction at issue ultimately involved interstate 
commerce to the extent that Allied-Bruce and Terminix had an interstate relationship and the 
materials used by Allied-Bruce were imported into Alabama from out of state. See id. at 282. 
 210. Id. at 277. 
 211. See id. at 280–81. 
 212. Id. at 280. 
 213. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953). 
 214. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 215. Id. at 23. 
 216. See id. at 27–29. 
 217. Id. 
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enacted as would a judicial forum.218  The Court also rejected the idea that 
the ADEA required that claims be heard in a judicial forum, especially 
considering the statute’s reference to the use of out-of-court methods to 
resolve disputes.219  This decision explicitly departed from the principle, 
articulated first in Wilko and upheld in the Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co. cases,220 that public policy concerns provide a reason to withhold 
claims from the arbitration system.221
In 1996, in what one scholar describes as the “devastati[on of] virtually 
all state attempts to protect consumers, franchisees, and other weaker 
parties,”
 
222 the Supreme Court, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,223 
expanded its holding from Southland Corp. v. Keating224 to find that the 
FAA preempted a state statute that imposed specific typographical 
requirements on arbitration agreements.225  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Ginsburg found that under section 2 of the FAA, courts could not refuse to 
enforce arbitration agreements on account of laws that apply only to 
arbitration.226  By imposing a requirement on arbitration agreements that 
was not imposed on other types of contracts, the Montana statute in 
question violated section 2 of the FAA, which expressed Congress’s goal of 
placing arbitration agreements “‘upon the same footing as other contracts,’” 
and was thus preempted.227  This holding greatly limited the requirements 
that state arbitration statutes may place on arbitration clauses.228
 
 218. Id. at 28 (“Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms . . . can further broader 
social purposes.”). 
 
 219. Id. at 29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (encouraging the resolution of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims through “informal methods of 
conciliation, conference, and persuasion”). 
 220. See 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974); supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Sternlight, supra note 205, at 671.  The Court in Gilmer did not overturn the 
Alexander-Gardner holding, but merely pointed to disparities between that case and the case 
at hand. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35; MACNEIL, supra note 114, at 76–77. 
 222. See Sternlight, supra note 205, at 667. 
 223. 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).   
 224. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts 
inconsistent state arbitration laws); see also supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 225. Montana’s arbitration statute required an arbitration clause to be typed in underlined 
capital letters on the front page of the contract to be enforceable upon the naissance of a 
dispute. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 684. 
 226. See id. at 687. 
 227. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).  
 228. See Sternlight, supra note 205, at 668.  Sternlight points out that a state may be able 
to provide for protective measures against arbitration agreements perceived as unfair by 
enacting blanket prohibitions against certain practices in all contracts, as long as arbitration 
agreements are not singled out. See id. at 668 n.176; see also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal 
Arbitration Act:  The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, 
and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 880 (2002) (“[S]tates cannot give 
consumers the level of protection that their public policies might warrant.”);  Van Wezel 
Stone, supra note 200, at 948 (“State law contract defenses to arbitration can only be raised 
if they are matters of general law, not if they are provisions directed at arbitration.”). 
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5.  Total Enforcement:  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Arbitration 
Since 2000 
The Supreme Court in the last few years has decided several cases that 
have had a significant impact on the legal environment surrounding 
arbitration.  These decisions reflect a continuation of the policy in favor of 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in numerous contexts. 
In 2000, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,229 the 
Court rejected a consumer’s argument that an arbitration agreement that 
failed to indicate which party would be responsible for arbitration costs was 
not enforceable.230  Larketta Randolph argued that the agreement, silent as 
to costs, would prevent her from adequately vindicating her rights, because 
she might face a situation in which the costs of arbitration were too 
steep.231  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
asserted that invalidation of the agreement would violate the Court’s policy 
in favor of arbitration.232  Similarly, the Court found that invalidation of the 
agreement would also violate the Court’s requirement that the party seeking 
to avoid an arbitration agreement prove that arbitration is inappropriate.233
With this decision the Court began the new millennium reasserting its 
belief that an arbitral tribunal is as suitable a forum as a judicial tribunal for 
the vindication of consumers’ rights.
 
234  The Court continued to enforce 
aspects of arbitration in 2003 in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,235 
holding that when an arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class-wide 
arbitration, the decision of whether class claims could be compelled into 
arbitration was for the arbitrator.236  This holding greatly increased the 
authority granted to arbitrators.237
In 2008, the Court limited judicial review of an arbitration award in Hall 
Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.
 
238  The parties in this case, a landlord 
and tenant, had included a clause in the arbitration agreement between them 
providing that an arbitrator’s award could be reviewed for error by a 
court.239
 
 229. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
  The Court held that parties could not contract around the FAA’s 
provisions for review, as the grounds delineated in the FAA were the sole 
 230. See id. at 89–92. 
 231. Id. at 90. 
 232. Id. at 91. 
 233. Id. at 91–92. 
 234. See id. at 90; see also Pittman, supra note 228, at 882 (“To the extent that a 
consumer purchaser is less likely to meet the burden of proving that the arbitration costs are 
prohibitive, Green Tree is a pro-arbitration decision.”). 
 235. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 236. See id. at 447. 
 237. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 151, at 244 (noting that the holding in Bazzle “extends 
the reach of the arbitrator’s discretion, limits the role of the courts in regard to the arbitral 
process, and enhances the systemic autonomy of arbitration”). 
 238. 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). 
 239. See id. at 579–80; see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 151, at 253 (noting that the 
ruling in Hall Street was expected “to resolve the split between the federal circuits regarding 
the validity and enforceability of opt-in provisions”). 
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means for obtaining review.240  This decision reaffirmed the supremacy of 
the FAA by limiting the ability of parties voluntarily to opt out of the 
FAA’s requirements.241
In June 2010, the Court again weighed in on the enforceability of specific 
provisions in arbitration clauses in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.
 
242  
In an employment discrimination suit in which the plaintiff alleged 
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,243 the parties had signed an 
arbitration clause that included a provision mandating that any question 
about the interpretation or applicability of the arbitration agreement be 
resolved by the arbitrator.244  The employee, Antonio Jackson, argued that 
the agreement was unconscionable.245  In response, Rent-a-Center argued 
that the question of the unconscionability of the agreement could not 
properly be heard by the court but must be decided by the arbitrator.246  The 
Court rejected Jackson’s argument, finding that only the arbitrator, and not 
the court, could decide the question of unconscionability of the 
agreement.247  Because the Court found that the plaintiff was challenging 
the validity of the contract as a whole, the challenge was properly before the 
arbitrator and not a court.248
In April 2010, the Court decided Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,
 
249 a decision that emphasized the necessity of consent 
in agreements to arbitrate.250  Evaluating an arbitration clause silent on the 
issue of class arbitration,251 the Court held that the defendant company 
could not compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate as a class because the parties had 
not previously agreed to class arbitration.252  The Court repeatedly referred 
to “the consensual nature” of arbitration and the importance of the parties’ 
intent.253  Notably, the Court also held that the arbitration panel “exceeded 
its powers,” which was grounds for vacatur under section 10(a)(4) of the 
FAA.254  Because the Court found that the panel ignored relevant law and 
instead “imposed its own conception of sound policy,” the Court vacated 
the award.255
 
 240. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. 585–89. 
 
 241. See id.; see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 151, at 254 (“Hall Street Associates is 
unquestionably a favorable-to-arbitration ruling. . . . There is . . . no question about the 
legitimacy of arbitration or its function in either the majority or dissenting opinions.”). 
 242. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010). 
 243. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 244. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2779. 
 248. Id.  The Court pointed out, however, that if a party challenges the validity of the 
agreement to arbitrate in particular, judicial review is required. Id. at 2778. 
 249. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 250. See id. at 1774. 
 251. Id. at 1766. 
 252. Id. at 1775. 
 253. See id. at 1774. 
 254. Id. at 1770. 
 255. Id. at 1776. 
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In November 2010, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of  
AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.256  The case addressed a conflict 
between the FAA and a California state court’s decision that an arbitration 
agreement prohibiting class arbitration was unconscionable.257  Some 
commentators have expressed that a potential win for AT & T would be 
“grossly unfair,”258 while others have touted the virtues of finding in favor 
of AT & T and therefore in favor of the supremacy of the FAA.259
A recent case in the Southern District of New York demonstrates the 
compliance of lower courts with the Supreme Court’s current arbitration 
policy.  In November 2010, a federal judge upheld a record-setting 
judgment of $20.6 million against Goldman Sachs,
 
260 rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that the arbitration panel had exceeded its powers in 
granting such a large award.261
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act,
 
262 enacted in July 2010, is another recent 
development in arbitration law.263  Concern about financial customs in the 
current economy led to the enactment of this legislation in an effort to 
proscribe numerous practices considered problematic.264  Among other 
things, the Act created a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.265  
The Act explicitly grants the new agency the power to prohibit or impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements.266
 
 256. See Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub 
nom. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010); Oral Argument,  
AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (No. 09-893), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_09_893. 
  Specifically, the Act requires the agency to study “the use 
 257. See Laster, 584 F.3d at 854–55. 
 258. Editorial, The Arbitration War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, at A18. 
 259. See Robin Conrad, AT & T Mobility v. Concepcion:  Preserving Arbitration for 
Businesses and Consumers, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/252893/iatt-mobility-v-concepcioni-
preserving-arbitration-businesses-and-consumers-robin# (“Consumers who have legitimate 
grievances deserve access to the expedient and user-friendly system that Congress has 
already declared should be available as a contractual alternative to litigation.”). 
 260. See Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ 
Comm. of Bayou Grp., LLC, No. 10 Civ. 5622 (JSR), 2010 WL 4877847, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 30, 2010). 
 261. See id.; see also Susanne Craig, Judge Upholds Award Against Goldman, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 8, 2010, 11:29 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/judge-upholds-award-against-goldman/?scp=
1&sq=rakoff%20arbitration&st=cse. 
 262. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of tits. 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 263. See id. § 1028, 124 Stat. at 2003 (providing for analysis and rulemaking in the field 
of mandatory consumer arbitration).  
 264. Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST (July 16, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071500464.
html?sid=ST2010071504699. 
 265. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 266. See id. § 1028, 124 Stat. at 2003–04; see also Budnitz, supra note 25, at 1204–05 
(“[T]he new agency should determine if arbitrations ‘promote fair adjudication and effective 
redress’ and should ban the clauses if necessary.” (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
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of agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute . . . in 
connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or 
services.”267  Based on the results of the study, the agency may decide to 
impose limitations on pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements, but may 
not impose restrictions on voluntary post-dispute consumer arbitration 
agreements.268
D.  Federal Statutory Claims, the FAA, and the Courts 
 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has subjected claims under 
numerous federal statutes to arbitration.269  Courts examining whether or 
not arbitration agreements are enforceable when dealing with such claims 
typically apply the test delineated by the Supreme Court in Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon.270  There, the Court held that to overcome the 
presumption in favor of arbitrability, the relevant statute must indicate 
Congressional intent to prohibit arbitration.271  Such intent is to be 
determined by examination of the text and legislative history of the statute, 
as well as a consideration of whether an inherent conflict exists between the 
underlying purposes of the statute and arbitration.272
While the Supreme Court has held that the statutory rights of consumers 
are protected equally by arbitration and litigation,
 
273 some federal statutes 
explicitly limit the enforceability of arbitration provisions in consumer 
agreements.274  For example, the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act prohibits the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a 
consumer credit agreement signed by a covered member of the armed 
forces or the member’s dependent.275  Similarly, in 2002, Congress passed 
the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Dispute Resolution Process Act.276
 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 62, available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/
LPS113933/LPS113933/www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2010))). 
  
This statute requires the written consent of all parties to a dispute to submit 
their claims to arbitration, regardless of whether the parties had already 
 267. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(a), 124 Stat. at 2003–04. 
 268. Id. § 1028(b)–(c), 124 Stat. at 2004. 
 269. See supra Part II.C. 
 270. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987); see also 
supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 271. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Speidel, supra note 19, at 1086 (“[M]ost statutory claims . . . are capable of final 
settlement by private agreement . . . . The decision to withhold a statutory claim from 
arbitration should be made by Congress at the time the right is created . . . .”); supra Part 
II.C.4–5. 
 274. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:  
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS app. A.2, at 278 (5th ed. 2007). 
 275. 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006). 
 276. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1835, 1835–36 (2002) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)). 
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entered into a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate.277  The Act applies to 
contracts between car dealers and franchisors.278
While these provisions clearly limit the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses, ambiguity exists as to whether claims arising under other statutes 
can be forced into arbitration pursuant to a signed arbitration agreement.
 
279  
For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act (MMWA),280 designed to protect consumers in signing 
agreements for product warranties,281 allows warrantors to mandate that 
consumers submit claims arising under the MMWA to informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms.282  The MMWA expressly states that these 
informal processes must be non-binding and that consumers retain the right 
to bring MMWA claims in court.283  For this reason, some courts have held 
that the MMWA prohibits binding arbitration.284  Two appellate courts, 
however, have reversed lower court decisions precluding binding arbitration 
of MMWA claims and have held that arbitration agreements under the 
MMWA are enforceable.285
A clash between the FAA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code raises similar 
questions.
 
286  The Bankruptcy Code grants to district courts original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters.287  A conflict has developed 
over whether this means that all claims under the Bankruptcy Code must be 
heard in a district court and therefore that all relevant arbitration provisions 
are unenforceable.288
 
 277. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). 
  Most courts have compelled arbitration of claims 
 278. Id. § 1226(a)(1)(B); see also BLAND ET AL., supra note 274, app. A.2.2, at 279. 
 279. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 274, § 4.2.1.1, at 56–57. 
 280. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312. 
 281. See Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the 
Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 173, 184 (2003) (describing the statute as “a reaction to the inability of 
consumers to bargain over and meaningfully consent to the terms of a product warranty”). 
 282. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 274, § 4.2.2.1, at 58; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3). 
 283. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)–(d). 
 284. See, e.g., Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 
2002) (“Any informal dispute settlement procedure that may be utilized to resolve written 
warranty disputes under the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act (MMWA)] must be a non-binding mechanism, which serves as a 
prerequisite, and not a bar, to relief in court.”); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 
124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964–65 (W.D. Va. 2000) (“The clear intent of Magnuson-Moss . . . is 
to encourage alternate dispute settlement mechanisms, but to not deprive any party of their 
right to . . . a judicial forum.”). 
 285. See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1273–77 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(looking at the text, legislative history, and underlying purposes of the MMWA and finding 
that none of these factors indicated Congress’s intent to prohibit binding arbitration); Walton 
v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Consumers can still 
vindicate their rights under warranties in an arbitral forum . . . . Arbitration is not inherently 
unfair to consumers.”). 
 286. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 274, § 4.2.3, at 70–73. 
 287. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006). 
 288. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 274, § 4.2.3.2–4, at 70–72; see also Mette H. Kurth, 
Comment, An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy:  The Arbitration Act and the 
Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1002 (1996) (“The cases [addressing 
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relating to non-core matters of bankruptcy issues,289 while granting that 
courts have discretion over the enforceability of arbitration of core 
matters.290  Similar conflicts have developed in relation to the False Claims 
Act (FCA)291 and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA).292
III.  THE CREDIT REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS ACT IN COURT:  THE SPLIT OVER 
WHETHER A COURT MAY COMPEL A CONSUMER TO ARBITRATE CLAIMS 
UNDER THE CREDIT REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS ACT 
 
This part examines the circuit split over the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements under the CROA.  It analyzes the different approaches taken by 
courts, as well as scholarly opinions supporting each side. 
While the Supreme Court has decided many cases concerning the 
arbitrability of rights granted by federal statutes,293 few federal circuit 
courts have weighed in on whether claims under the CROA specifically are 
arbitrable.  In addition to those circuit courts that have addressed the split, a 
number of cases in district courts have dealt with the issue as well.  Those 
courts that have confronted the issue have resolved it in one of two 
conflicting ways:  compelling arbitration294 or prohibiting arbitration.295 
The controversy springs from the CROA’s mandated disclosure that 
consumers have the “right to sue”296 and its repeated references to courts, 
but its lack of explicit language mandating that claims be heard in a judicial 
forum.297
 
whether bankruptcy claims can be arbitrated] differ markedly in their treatment of core 
proceedings, policy, efficiency concerns, and balancing tests.”). 
 
 289. See Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1157 
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that “the text of the Bankruptcy Code embodies the principle that 
pre-petition contract rights are enforceable in a bankruptcy proceeding” and enforcing 
arbitration of claims). But see In re Guild Music Corp., 100 B.R. 624, 628 (Bankr. D.R.I. 
1989) (holding that the court has discretion to refuse to enforce the arbitration of non-core 
matters). 
 290. See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying 
motion to compel arbitration). But see James P. Barkman, Inc. v. Granger Constr. Co. (In re 
James P. Barkman, Inc.), 170 B.R. 321, 323 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (noting in dicta 
that the core/non-core distinction is irrelevant). 
 291. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (2006). Compare Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 
2d 643, 644 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (declining to compel arbitration of FCA claims), with United 
States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 325 (4th Cir. 2001) (compelling arbitration of FCA 
claims). 
 292. 34 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2006). Compare Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 
1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005) (refusing to compel arbitration of Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) claims), with Landis, O.D. 
v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2008) (enforcing arbitration of 
USERRA claims, largely because the language and legislative history of the statute is silent 
as to arbitration, and there is no inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes of 
USERRA), and Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 293. See supra Part II.C. 
 294. See infra Part III.A. 
 295. See infra Part III.B. 
 296. 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006). 
 297. See Ropiequet & Hirsh, supra note 59, at 14, 18–20. 
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A.  Under the CROA, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Enforceable 
Before August 2010, the only circuit courts to address this conflict had 
compelled arbitration of CROA claims.298
1.  The Third Circuit 
  This section examines the cases 
that have produced these decisions and analyzes the reasoning that has led 
these courts to hold that the CROA does not prohibit mandatory arbitration. 
The first circuit court to weigh in on the issue of the arbitrability of 
claims under the CROA was the Third Circuit in 2007 in Gay v. 
CreditInform.299  Mary Gay purchased credit repair services from 
CreditInform and Intersections, Inc., seeking to monitor and improve her 
credit history.300  After eight months of making monthly payments of $4.99 
to Intersections,301 she received no services or benefits.302  Gay sued 
Intersections for violations of the CROA, specifically for requiring payment 
before services were rendered and for requiring a waiver of rights to which 
Gay was entitled under the CROA.303  Additionally, Gay argued that 
Intersections failed to make the required disclosures under the CROA.304  
Intersections filed a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, in 
accordance with an arbitration agreement Gay had signed upon purchasing 
Intersections’s services.305  The district court granted the defendants’ 
motion in light of the arbitration agreement, stayed the case, and ordered the 
parties to arbitrate the claims in question on an individual basis.306
Gay contended that by means of the nature of her claims under the 
CROA, she had an automatic right to sue in court.
 
307  She asserted that 
references in section 1679g of the CROA to a “court” confirmed her right to 
avoid arbitration.308
 
 298. See id. at 21 (“[T]here is a much clearer trend in favor of finding that CROA claims 
are arbitrable . . . .”). 
  She identified section 1679c(a), which requires a 
 299. 511 F.3d 369, 375 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court and, as far as we are aware, 
no court of appeals has addressed the issues that we now address under the CROA.”). 
 300. See id. 
 301. Id.  CreditInform is a registered trademark of Capital One, used to market products 
and services of Capital One, which are ultimately provided by Intersections.  Although the 
suit initially named CreditInform as a defendant along with Intersections, Gay voluntarily 
dismissed CreditInform from the suit. See id. at 374 n.1. 
 302. See id. at 375. 
 303. See id. at 374–75. 
 304. See id. at 375. 
 305. The arbitration agreement stated, “Any claim arising out of or relating to the Product 
shall be settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of 
the American Arbitration Association on an individual basis not consolidated with any other 
claim.” Id. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See id. at 376–78. 
 308. See id.  For example, the statute states that punitive damages are awarded “as the 
court may allow”; that class actions are calculated by an amount which “the court may 
allow”; and that the “court shall consider” several factors in determining the amount of 
punitive damages to be awarded. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679g (2006). 
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credit repair organization to inform consumers that they have a “right to 
sue” for any violation of the CROA, as additional support for this claim.309
Intersections argued that the CROA does not provide a right to sue in a 
judicial forum and that even if this right did exist, the statute does not 
prevent a consumer from waiving such right under the statute.
 
310  
According to this reasoning, when Gay signed the agreement to arbitrate, 
she lost any right she may have had to sue in a judicial forum.311
The Third Circuit agreed with Intersections and rejected Gay’s claims.
 
312  
The court followed its holding in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank313 in 
resolving the dispute.  There, having found that the legislative history of 
TILA did not demonstrate an intent to preclude arbitration, the court held 
that there was no irreconcilable conflict between TILA’s purposes and 
arbitration of such claims.314  Similarly, the court in Gay found that even 
though the CROA’s language reflects an assumption that claims will be 
brought in a judicial forum, the statute does not create an independent right 
to such forum nor does it indicate that such a right cannot be waived by an 
arbitration agreement.315
The Third Circuit also based its decision on Supreme Court precedent, 
finding that the anti-waiver provision in the CROA is equivalent to those in 
both RICO and the Securities Exchange Act.
 
316  As a result, the court held 
that the anti-waiver provision of the CROA covered only the substantive 
obligations imposed by the statute and not the procedural requirements.317  
Based on this reasoning, the court affirmed the district court’s order 
compelling arbitration of Gay’s CROA claims.318
 
 309. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 377 n.4.  The court dispensed with this argument in a footnote, 
because “the section does not specify the forum for the resolution of the dispute and 
therefore does not support Gay’s argument that the CROA provides a consumer with the 
right to bring suit in a judicial, rather than arbitral, forum for CROA violations.” Id. 
 
 310. See id. at 378. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 385. 
 313. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).  This case considered the issue of whether claims 
arising under TILA, see supra Part I.A.1, may be subject to mandatory arbitration in lieu of 
class action litigation.  The plaintiff argued that repeated references to “class actions” within 
the statute granted to consumers the right to file claims as class actions and overrode 
agreements to arbitrate on an individual basis. See id. at 369, 371, 377–78; see also Gay, 511 
F.3d at 379. 
 314. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 381 (“‘The notion that there is a meaningful distinction 
between vindicating a statute’s social purposes and adjudicating private grievances for the 
purposes of determining whether a statute precludes compelling arbitration under a valid 
arbitration clause was rejected by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp.’” (quoting Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374)). 
 315. See id. at 382.  The court called this assumption “hardly surprising,” as an individual 
who believes she is the victim of a wrong will ordinarily have a right to sue in court. Id. 
 316. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482–83 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231–34 (1987); supra Part 
II.C.4. 
 317. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 382–85. 
 318. See id. at 395. 
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2.  The Eleventh Circuit 
In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this conflict in Picard v. Credit 
Solutions, Inc.319 and followed the Third Circuit’s lead, holding that the 
CROA does not preclude arbitration.320  The plaintiff in the case was a 
customer of Credit Solutions (CSA), a company purporting to lower clients’ 
debts by negotiating with unsecured creditors.321  Picard, facing increasing 
debt and persistent creditors, electronically entered into an agreement for 
CSA’s services, which contained a mandatory arbitration clause.322  Less 
than a month later, creditors began calling Picard to report that she had 
defaulted on her accounts.323  She filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and filed 
suit against CSA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama.324  The district court rejected CSA’s motion to compel 
arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was void under the CROA.325  
On appeal, CSA argued that the CROA does not preclude arbitration,326 
while Picard argued that she should not be forced to arbitrate because the 
CROA entitled her to a suit in court.327
The Eleventh Circuit found that the CROA does not create a 
contractually unwaivable right to sue in court.
 
328  The court acknowledged 
its adherence to Supreme Court holdings indicating an inclination to 
enforce arbitration clauses, and noted that the clause at hand was 
unenforceable only upon a finding that Congress had intended to prohibit 
waiver of a judicial forum.329  In resolving this question, the court followed 
the lead of the Third Circuit in adhering to the decisions interpreting 
arbitration clauses under the Securities Act and RICO, finding that these 
cases supported the defendant’s position that the statute in question did not 
prohibit arbitration.330
Additionally, the court held that the only right created in the disclosure 
provision of the CROA was the right to be told certain information.
 
331  
Because the “right to sue” was not mentioned in the civil liability section of 
the CROA, the statute placed no limitation on arbitration.332
 
 319. 564 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Whether CROA prohibits arbitration is an 
issue of first impression in this Court.”). 
  The court 
found that even if a statute requires organizations to inform consumers of 
 320. Id. at 1255.  With this holding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed a district court’s contrary holding. Id., rev’g Reynolds v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 541 
F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258–60 (N.D. Ala. 2008). 
 321. See id. at 1251. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See id. at 1251–52. 
 324. See id. at 1252. 
 325. See id. 
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. 
 328. See id. at 1255. 
 329. See id. at 1253. 
 330. See id. at 1255; supra Part II.C.4. 
 331. See Picard, 564 F.3d at 1255. 
 332. Id. 
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the right to a private action, such disclosure does not preclude waiver of 
that right.333  The court overturned the district court’s refusal to compel 
arbitration and ordered Picard to submit her claims to arbitration.334
3.  The Sixth Circuit 
 
A case from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan 
followed this line of reasoning, holding that CROA claims are arbitrable 
pursuant to a mandatory arbitration agreement.335  The case involved a debt 
settlement company that entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, 
Revialo Rex, to provide debt settlement services.336  Instead of receiving 
the repair to his credit that he sought, Rex learned of two lawsuits filed 
against him by Citibank stemming from his failure to make payments.337  
Rex filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau, at which point CSA 
offered to refund the fees Rex had already paid.338  Because Rex agreed to 
this settlement with CSA, the Bureau closed the investigation;339 thereafter 
Rex filed suit for violations of the CROA.340
Noting the federal policy of resolving disputes in favor of arbitration,
 
341 
the district court embarked on an evaluation of the statute’s text and 
legislative history, and an examination of whether there was an inherent 
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s purposes.342  The court 
observed that the civil liability section of the CROA establishes no 
particular forum in which claims should be brought.343  Furthermore, the 
court explicitly rejected the opinion of a district court in Texas that the 
mention of a “right to sue” in section 1679c—the required disclosures 
provision of the CROA—sets forth an independent right.344  The court 
stated that the disclosure requirements do not provide consumers with any 
rights beyond that of the required disclosures, which merely establish 
wording that must be employed in communicating with consumers and 
describing their rights under other sections of the CROA.345
 
 333. Id. (stating that the CROA “simply does not create a right to sue only in a judicial 
forum”). 
  For these 
 334. Id. at 1256.  The Court explicitly stated that “[t]he substantive rights created in 
CROA are entirely preserved in an arbitral forum.” Id. at 1255. 
 335. Rex v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 788, 800 (W.D. Mich. 
2007). 
 336. See id. at 792. 
 337. See id.  Citibank prevailed against Rex in both lawsuits. See id. 
 338. See id. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. 
 341. See id. at 793 (arbitration clauses should be enforced “‘unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that 
covers the asserted dispute’” (quoting Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John 
Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2003))). 
 342. See id. at 797. 
 343. See id. at 798. 
 344. See id. at 798–99; Alexander v. U.S. Credit Mgmt, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 
(N.D. Tex. 2005); see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 345. See Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 799. 
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reasons, the court found that nothing in the text of the statute indicated that 
arbitration of CROA claims was prohibited.346
The court did not examine the legislative history of the CROA, as neither 
party had pointed to language in the legislative history to illuminate the 
issue.
 
347  In analyzing whether the goals of the statute and arbitration 
conflicted, the court found that no conflict existed because the Supreme 
Court had enforced arbitration of claims under statutes whose intent was to 
provide increased consumer protection.348
The Western District of Michigan followed this reasoning in Vegter v. 
Forecast Financial Corp.,
 
349
4.  The Eighth Circuit 
 holding that under the CROA, a mandatory 
arbitration agreement with a debt reduction company was enforceable.  
Without a decision from the Sixth Circuit on the issue, however, these 
district court cases have narrow precedential value. 
The only court within the Eighth Circuit to confront this issue has held 
that arbitration agreements may be enforced under the CROA.350  In 2007, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska examined plaintiff 
Richard Schreiner’s claim of CROA violations against Credit Advisors, a 
debt-management service operating in Omaha.351  Quoting the language of 
the Western District of Michigan in Rex that the use of separate sections 
setting forth required disclosures and civil liability indicated that the 
disclosures did not constitute an independent right, the court stated that the 
only evidence of congressional intent to void arbitration clauses under the 
CROA was “the word ‘sue’ and the reference to district courts.”352  Thus, 
the court “adopt[ed] the analysis and conclusion in Rex v. CSA that claims 
brought under the CROA are arbitrable.”353
5.  In Favor of Enforceability 
 
Those courts that have held that the CROA does not preclude arbitration 
have generally based their holdings on both the lack of explicit language to 
the contrary and the similarity of the conflict to existing Supreme Court 
precedent, finding that fidelity to such precedent mandates allowing 
arbitration agreements in credit repair contracts.  Several scholars who 
advocate for the continued enforcement of consumer arbitration clauses 
 
 346. See id. at 799. 
 347. See id. at 800. 
 348. See id. (“‘[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced arbitration of statutory 
claims where the underlying purpose of the statutes are to protect and inform consumers.’” 
(quoting Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002))). 
 349. No. 1:07-CV-279, 2007 WL 4178947, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2007). 
 350. Schreiner v. Credit Advisors, Inc., No. 8:07CV78, 2007 WL 2904098, at *11 (D. 
Neb. Oct. 2, 2007); see also supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
 351. See Schreiner, 2007 WL 2904098 at *1. 
 352. See id. at *11. 
 353. See id. 
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support this policy.  Arguments in support of pre-dispute consumer 
arbitration include cost-saving contentions354 and freedom of contract 
logic.355  These scholars argue that arbitration enables businesses to save 
money on the costs of resolving disputes, and as a result of competition 
between companies, these savings are passed on to consumers.356  Others 
point out that principles of contract law invalidating adhesionary or 
unconscionable contracts adequately protect consumers from being 
compelled to arbitrate in unfair situations.357  Consequently, there should be 
no other grounds to invalidate agreements that meet the requirements of 
fairness under contractual principles.358
Scholars also point to the original impetus for the widespread use of 
arbitration, arguing that the delays, expense, and rigidity of judicial 
tribunals repel many from seeking legal recourse.
 
359  They argue that the 
Supreme Court has made a value judgment that arbitration is an adequate 
solution to these problems, a decision stemming purely from a belief in the 
merits of arbitration,360 and that the problems inherent in arbitration remain 
problematic in judicial proceedings as well.361
B.  Under the CROA, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Not Enforceable 
 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to hold that mandatory 
arbitration agreements under the CROA are void and unenforceable.  
Similarly, a district court in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
the first court to address the conflict, held that claims under the CROA are 
 
 354. See Brief of Consumer Data Industry Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 16, CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-
948) (“[A]rbitration agreements permit [businesses] to predictably manage their litigation 
costs for any disputes related to their products and services.”); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the 
Price of Process:  Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 89, 90 (“[J]udicial regulation of consumer arbitration agreements imposes costs on 
consumers.”). 
 355. See Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 211–12 (1998) 
(“Companies using arbitration are exploiting consumers. . . . [T]he company is exploiting the 
consumer’s desire for something the company has in order to get . . . a promise to arbitrate.  
And the consumer is exploiting the company’s desire for something the consumer has 
(typically money) in order to get something from the company.”). 
 356. See generally Ware, supra note 354. 
 357. See Carbonneau, Triumph, supra note 19, at 400 (“Parties in the marketplace should 
be at liberty to agree to any exchange to which they mutually consent . . . . Coerced 
agreements are not consensual undertakings; the authority of law cannot be used to give 
them effect.”). 
 358. See id. at 414–17 (suggesting ways to ensure that arbitration agreements meet 
contract fairness requirements). 
 359. See Carbonneau, Revolution, supra note 19, at 265. 
 360. See id. at 264 (“Neither quiet moneyed interests nor vocal special interests groups 
have imposed an agenda on, or influenced, the Court.  The policy favoring arbitration 
appears to be a purely judicial policy, instituted to achieve the ends of the legal system.”). 
 361. See Carbonneau, Triumph, supra note 19, at 413 (“[Party inequality problems] are 
not exclusive to arbitration—they exist among unequal parties in the process of judicial 
litigation . . . .”). 
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not subject to mandatory arbitration.  This section considers the reasoning 
followed by these courts in finding that the CROA precludes arbitration. 
1.  The Fifth Circuit 
In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
decided Alexander v. U.S. Credit Management, Inc.,362 holding that claims 
under the CROA cannot be forced into arbitration.  A class of customers 
brought suit against U.S. Credit Management (USCM) for violations of the 
CROA disclosure and fee payment requirements.363  While the court 
acknowledged the policy established by the Supreme Court in favor of 
arbitration and that the arbitration agreement met the first step of the 
circuit’s two-step evaluation of arbitration,364 the court found merit in the 
plaintiffs’ argument that an intention of Congress to prevent the waiver of 
judicial remedies can override the policy of the FAA.365
The court stated that the CROA grants four rights, one of which is “the 
right to sue.”
 
366  The court read this term in the disclosure provision 
alongside the non-waiver provision to find that a waiver of judicial 
remedies is unenforceable under the CROA, determining that mention of 
the “right to sue” demonstrates Congress’s intent to preclude arbitration.367
In explaining why a “right to sue” is not provided by mandatory 
arbitration, the court identified arbitration and litigation as fundamentally 
distinct.
 
368  Using the definitions of both “arbitration” and “sue” stated in 
Black’s Law Dictionary and Corpus Juris Secundum, the court emphasized 
that a lawsuit is defined as a proceeding occurring “in a court of law,” and 
that “arbitration is not a judicial proceeding.”369  The court maintained that 
Congress would not require rights to be explained to consumers and then 
allow the waiver of such rights.370
The court distinguished the Supreme Court precedent upholding the 
arbitration of statutory claims.
 
371  The court referred to the “right to sue” 
language in the statute as “express language” indicating a clear intent to bar 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.372
 
 362. 384 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1016 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
  The court used its own 
 363. See id. at 1004–05. 
 364. See id. at 1006 (“First, courts determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their 
disputes, considering (a) the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, and (b) whether the 
agreement encompasses the dispute between the parties.  Second, courts ‘must consider 
whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable.’” (quoting R.M. Perez 
& Assoc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
 365. See id. at 1008. 
 366. Id. at 1011–12. 
 367. See id. at 1012. 
 368. See id. at 1011 (“The act of suing in a court of law is distinctly different from 
arbitration.”). 
 369. See id. 
 370. See id. at 1012. 
 371. See id. at 1012–15 (stating that these statutes lacked the congressional intent of the 
CROA as well as the broad anti-waiver provisions); see also supra Part II.C.4. 
 372. See Alexander, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. 
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precedent—ultimately overturned a year after this decision—as an example 
of a case supporting the plaintiffs’ opinion that arbitration should not be 
compelled because of express language within the statute.373
Additionally, the court examined the legislative history of the CROA, 
pointing to what it saw as a clear intent to protect consumers.
 
374  The court 
cited a letter from the Chairman of the FTC stating that the bill provided a 
right to sue and that this provision was a valuable aspect of the CROA.375  
According to the court, a previous version of the bill stated that claims 
under the CROA should be brought in any district court.376  The court 
interpreted the change in the language as stemming from the need to 
simplify the language for the average consumer’s understanding.377  The 
court determined that the CROA’s drafters moved this language from the 
interior of the statute to the disclosure provision to ensure that all 
consumers would be aware of this right.378  On these grounds, the court 
rejected USCM’s assertion that the arbitration agreement was enforceable 
and denied the motion to compel arbitration.379
2.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
In August 2010, the Ninth Circuit decided Greenwood v. CompuCredit 
Corp.,380 thereby creating a definitive split among the circuits on this 
issue.381  The case involved a subprime credit card offered to consumers 
with low credit scores advertised as a way to ameliorate credit problems.382  
The agreement that the plaintiffs signed prior to receiving the card 
contained a mandatory arbitration provision.383  The plaintiffs filed suit in 
federal district court for violations of the CROA and California’s Unfair 
Competition Law after CompuCredit charged them $257 in fees.384  In 
denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, the 
district court held the arbitration clause invalid and void because the CROA 
protected the right to sue in court.385
 
 373. See id. at 1014 (citing Garret v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. 
Tex. 2004), rev’d, 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006), in which statutory claims arising under the 
USERRA could not be compelled into arbitration); see also supra note 
 
292. 
 374. See Alexander, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1014–15. 
 375. See id. at 1015. 
 376. See id. 
 377. See id. 
 378. See id. at 1016. 
 379. See id. 
 380. 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 381. A petition for certiorari was filed on January 24, 2011. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-948). 
 382. See Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1205. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. 
 385. See Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed.386  Like the court in Alexander, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the CROA’s required disclosures provision establishes 
four rights made unwaivable by the anti-waiver provision of the statute.387  
The court looked to the established definitions used by the Alexander court 
to highlight the differences between arbitration and a civil action.388  Credit 
Providers argued that because the “right to sue” language is contained only 
in the disclosure section of the statute, it does not create a separate right.389  
Unconvinced, the court asserted that Congress did not intend to require 
credit repair organizations “to misinform consumers about a fictional 
right.”390
Credit Providers also argued that because the anti-waiver provision states 
that a waiver cannot be enforced “by any Federal or State court or any other 
person,” Congress intended for arbitrators to hear CROA claims.
 
391  The 
court rejected this argument and stated that this language speaks to a 
situation in which an organization proceeds against a consumer in 
arbitration, at which point the consumer would retain these rights in the 
process of the arbitration.392  The court also pointed to the numerous usages 
of the word “courts” in the statute, which it interpreted as emphasizing the 
intended vital role of courts in CROA claims.393
Acknowledging the circuit split its decision created, the court stated that 
it was “unpersuaded” by the reasoning of its sister circuits.
 
394  The court 
described the holdings of the Third and Eleventh Circuits as unfairly 
disregarding the “right to sue” provision, and rejected the analogies to 
Supreme Court precedent in favor of arbitration.395
In dissent, Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima argued that nothing in the 
CROA evinces an intent to void arbitration agreements.
 
396  Judge Tashima 
argued that the “right to sue” language simply establishes what must be 
communicated to consumers, and does not create a substantive right.397
 
 386. See Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1205 (“We conclude that Congress meant what it said 
in using the term ‘sue,’ and that it did not mean ‘arbitrate.’”). 
  
Additionally, Judge Tashima found instructive the fact that each of the 
rights stated alongside the right to sue in section 1679c is separately stated 
elsewhere in the statute, showing that Congress included the disclosure 
provision simply to ensure the disclosure of rights that are then granted 
 387. See id. at 1207. 
 388. See id. at 1208; see also supra note 369 and accompanying text. 
 389. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1209. 
 390. See id. 
 391. See id. at 1208; see also Brief of Appellant at 19, Greenwood, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-15906) (“[B]y including ‘or any other person’ in the same sentence that 
addresses Federal and State courts, Congress acknowledged that arbitrators . . . may decide 
CROA claims.”). 
 392. See Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1208. 
 393. See id. at 1211. 
 394. Id. at 1211. 
 395. See id. at 1211–14. 
 396. See id. at 1214 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
 397. See id. at 1215. 
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elsewhere.398  Judge Tashima argued that the civil liability provision in 
section 1679g corresponds to the “right to sue” language and provides 
consumers with a right of action that is not required to be enforced 
anywhere in the CROA.399  Furthermore, Judge Tashima argued that 
because section 1679c(a) only requires written disclosures but creates no 
substantive rights, that provision could not be the basis of an unwaivable 
right.400  Judge Tashima also endorsed the defense’s argument based on the 
“any other person” language, finding that this language reveals Congress’s 
acknowledgement that third parties such as arbitrators may decide such 
cases.401
Finally, Judge Tashima expressed disagreement with the majority’s 
reliance on the word “courts,” finding that such word choice merely 
indicates that questions of civil liability will ordinarily be resolved in a 
judicial forum.
 
402  Pointing to the lack of both an inherent conflict and any 
dispositive legislative history, Judge Tashima cautioned against eschewing 
the holdings of the Third and Eleventh Circuits and endorsed the view that 
CROA claims are arbitrable.403
3.  Against Enforceability 
 
Those courts that disallow arbitration of CROA claims reinforce the 
theories of a number of scholars who advocate for a blanket prohibition of 
mandatory arbitration provisions in any agreement with a consumer.404  
Consumer protection advocates consistently argue that pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements are harmful to consumers.405  Additionally, 
supporters of this viewpoint contend that arbitration, and the FAA in 
general, was intended only to be used by businesses with equal bargaining 
power, and that consumer arbitration agreements should not be enforced 
pursuant to the FAA as it is currently written.406
In support of the opinion that mandatory arbitration of consumer disputes 
should not be enforced, proposed legislation recommends a broad 
 
 
 398. See id. 
 399. See id. at 1215–16. 
 400. See id. 
 401. See id.; see also supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
 402. See Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1216 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
 403. Id. at 1216 (“We should not lightly create a circuit split on an issue of national 
application on the basis of the flimsy evidence on which the majority relies.”). 
 404. See Sternlight, supra note 18, at 1674–75 (finding that mandatory arbitration clauses 
inserted by businesses into agreements with consumers, patients, students, and employees 
are inherently unjust); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 200, at 936 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s 
expansive doctrines, when applied to consumer transactions, contravene the statute’s intent 
and undermine many important due process and substantive rights.”). 
 405. See Sternlight, supra note 205, at 679 (“[E]ven assuming . . . that arbitration is 
cheaper, quicker, and even better for society as a whole, it may still not serve the interests of 
all parties.  Some could argue that a system of slavery would be more efficient for society as 
a whole, but that certainly does not mean that the system would be just or fair to the 
slaves.”). 
 406. See generally Feingold, supra note 18. 
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transformation in federal arbitration law.407  These proposals include 
eliminating the use of mandatory arbitration in consumer lending and credit 
card agreements,408 requiring arbitration agreements to meet certain criteria 
in order to be enforceable,409 and granting the power to regulate consumer 
arbitration to states.410  Advocates of these bills, or of any federal 
legislation limiting arbitration in the consumer context, vehemently contend 
that arbitration unfairly deprives consumers of inalienable rights and 
violates principles of democracy.411
This opposition to arbitration has resulted in a transformation of the 
treatment of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses in practice.  Banks and 
arbitration associations have retreated from the approach of full 
enforcement previously in effect.  For example, in July 2009, JP Morgan 
Chase announced that it would cease filing new arbitration claims and may 
stop including arbitration agreements in contracts altogether.
 
412  In August 
2009, Bank of America decided that credit card holders could bring claims 
in court even if they have previously signed a contract containing an 
arbitration agreement.413  Similarly, the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) has decided to stop hearing consumer debt collection claims 
pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration agreements.414
 
 407. See Sternlight, supra note 
  Likewise, the National 
Arbitration Forum (NAF) has decided to stop hearing cases arising from 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts following the settlement of a 
127, at 178–82 (“For those who oppose the use of 
mandatory arbitration in the consumer context it is clear that federal legislation is the most 
powerful tool by which such arbitration might be eliminated or regulated.”). 
 408. See 146 CONG. REC. 1722–24 (2000); see also 155 CONG. REC. 4897–99 (2009) (the 
2009 version of Senator Feingold’s proposed Arbitration Fairness Act). 
 409. See 146 CONG. REC. 22,861–65 (2000). 
 410. See Sternlight, supra note 127, at 181. 
 411. See Alderman, supra note 17, at 152–54; Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes 
Between Consumers and Financial Institutions:  A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 
10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 313–29 (1995); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small 
Print To Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 125–28; Smith, supra note 18, at 1222 
(“Mandatory arbitration effectively strips consumers of their rights to protect themselves 
from large corporations and jeopardizes the American judicial process of developing 
common law.”); Sternlight, supra note 18, at 1661–65. 
 412. See Ashby Jones, The Revolution Rolls On:  JP Morgan Chase Suspends Arbitration 
Activity, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 24, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2009/07/24/the-revolution-rolls-on-jpmorgan-chase-suspends-arbitration-activity/. 
 413. See Kathy Chu, Bank of America Ends Arbitration of Credit Card Disputes, U.S.A. 
TODAY (August 13, 2009, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/money/industries/banking/2009-08-13-bank-of-america-no-arbitration_N.htm; Jonathan 
Stempel, Bank of America Ends Arbitration of Card Disputes, REUTERS (Aug 14, 2009, 8:59 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57D03E20090814. 
 414. See Robin Sidel & Amol Sharma, Credit Card Disputes Tossed Into Disarray, WALL 
ST. J., July 22, 2009, at A1 (announcing the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) 
decision to stop hearing disputes involving consumers and their credit card and cell phone 
companies). 
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lawsuit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General stemming from the 
company’s connection to a major debt collection enterprise.415
IV.  WHY COURTS SHOULD FIND THAT THE CROA DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
ARBITRATION 
 
Parts I and II of this Note outlined the legal and theoretical foundations 
of the CROA and the FAA.  Part III examined the different ways courts 
have resolved a purported clash between the two statutes.  This part 
discusses why courts should continue to enforce arbitration agreements 
under the CROA.  First, it considers the importance of stare decisis in 
relation to this particular conflict.  Next, it addresses the concerns of those 
advocating for the prohibition of mandatory consumer arbitration 
agreements by examining consumer protection provided by mechanisms 
other than litigation.  Finally, this part suggests an alternative method to 
solve the current dispute by simply outlawing the operation of credit repair 
organizations. 
A.  Lower Courts Should Uphold the Supreme Court’s Strongly Expressed 
Policy in Favor of Arbitration 
The Supreme Court’s predilection for arbitration is unambiguous.416  As 
recently as June 2010, the Supreme Court endowed arbitrators with 
increased power and autonomy over the process of arbitration.417  Such 
decisions reflect a clear endorsement of the benefits of arbitration.418  That 
the Supreme Court has consistently upheld arbitration agreements and 
continued to rely on the efficacy of arbitration for the past thirty years419
Relatedly, the Supreme Court’s recent decision overturning the holding 
of three esteemed arbitrators
 
reflects a determination by the Court that any problems inherent in 
arbitration pose little threat to the democratic process. 
420
 
 415. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcy & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration 
Empire Upends Credit Card Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1. 
 indicates that while arbitration is valued as 
 416. See Carbonneau, Revolution, supra note 19, at 238 (“At every stage of arbitration’s 
ascendancy, the Court has provided the necessary doctrinal pronouncements and political 
muscle to confirm the gains achieved and to advance the process to the next level of its 
reformation.”); see also Brief for DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 9, CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 10-948) (“[The Ninth Circuit’s] approach to arbitrability not only threatens 
thousands of arbitration agreements; it is flatly contrary to the pro-arbitration policy 
embodied in the FAA and this Court’s previous decisions.”). 
 417. See supra notes 242–48 and accompanying text. 
 418. See Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (“The FAA . . . 
places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts 
to enforce them according to their terms.”); see also supra notes 242–48 and accompanying 
text. 
 419. See supra Part II.C. 
 420. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (2010) 
(“[I]nstead of identifying and applying a rule of decision . . . the arbitration panel imposed its 
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an alternative means for the vindication of legal rights, the Court retains a 
significant amount of control over arbitration awards to ensure that 
individual rights are protected.421  While several scholars have argued that 
mandatory consumer arbitration unfairly circumvents the judicial 
process,422 the vacatur of the award in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.423 shows that judicial review of arbitration awards 
remains a meaningful and viable channel.  This decision demonstrates that 
while the Court has afforded arbitration a great deal of deference, 
arbitration has not become a practice that is allowed to proceed unchecked 
and without the trappings of due process.424
Likewise, in the years since the passage of the FAA in 1925, the Supreme 
Court has never interpreted a federal statute to preclude arbitration, with the 
exception of labor statutes negotiated by a union.
  
425  Undoubtedly, the 
Court’s finding in Mitsubishi,426 that arbitration fully protects the statutory 
rights of participants, has endured and remained applicable for thirty 
years.427  Adherence to the Court’s policy in favor of arbitration of statutory 
claims is even more merited when considering the longstanding principle 
that stare decisis is more strictly adhered to when interpreting federal 
statutes than in other contexts.428  Because this principle acknowledges 
Congress’s ability to reverse a Court’s decision to allow arbitration of 
statutory claims, the fact that neither the FAA nor the numerous statutes 
under which arbitration has been compelled have been revised reflects 
Congress’s support for the Court’s allowance of arbitration under these 
statutes.429
 
own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.”); see also supra notes 
 
249–55 and 
accompanying text. 
 421. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
 422. See supra note 411 and accompanying text. 
 423. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (2010). 
 424. See Carbonneau, Revolution, supra note 19, at 266 (“Lawyers provide the hands-on 
supervision as counsel and advocates, while courts peer remotely into the process from a 
respectful distance.”). 
 425. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974) (holding that Title 
VII sought to enhance and not reduce a claimant’s possibilities for redress); see also 
Sternlight, supra note 205, at 672; supra note 190. 
 426. See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
 427. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 151, at 271 (“There are few, if any, federal statutes or 
rights that result in a judicial determination of inarbitrability.  The courts favor arbitration 
too greatly to find that statutory regulations should prohibit recourse to the process.”). 
 428. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (“[C]onsiderations of 
stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to 
change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”). 
 429. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 151, at 231 (discussing how claims arising under 
regulatory laws governing commercial conduct and federal statutes that create individual 
rights and implicate civil rights legislation and individual liberties have been submitted to 
arbitration); see also Speidel, supra note 19, at 1081 (“In the absence of a clear 
congressional decision that the statutory claim is not suitable for arbitration, the Court has 
stated that the nature of the claim is irrelevant because adjudication is simply shifted from a 
court to an arbitral forum that is capable of deciding the claims.”). 
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In addition to stare decisis concerns, courts should not refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements under the CROA because there is little proof that the 
arbitration process truly causes consumers any detriment that they would 
not otherwise endure in the litigation process.430  While some argue that 
mandatory arbitration favors large companies,431 the record-setting award 
against Goldman Sachs upheld by a federal judge in November 2010 tends 
to discredit this argument.432  The award, one of the largest arbitration 
awards ever granted, suggests that mandatory arbitration is not as 
unfavorable to the “little guys” as many argue.433  Additionally, the choice 
of arbitration provides some benefits to consumers, the deprivation of 
which may lead to higher costs of services.434
B.  Consumer Protection Is Supplied by Alternative Channels 
 
Courts should enforce arbitration agreements pursuant to current policy 
and judicial precedent because the inequities cited by those who oppose 
mandatory consumer arbitration may be prevented through alternative 
means.  Due to developments in consumer protection law as well as recent 
changes in the way banks and arbitration associations handle contracts, 
consumers may be protected from unfair arbitration agreements by methods 
other than judicial determinations denying arbitration.435
1.  Institutions Reject Arbitration Agreements 
 
By discontinuing the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, 
Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase have narrowed the number of 
scenarios in which arbitration agreements will be compelled.436  In the 
event that credit repair organizations do not similarly terminate usage of 
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements, however, the decision of two 
major arbitration associations to stop hearing cases arising out of mandatory 
consumer arbitration clauses has reduced the possibility that arbitration of 
CROA claims can effectively be compelled.437
 
 430. See Carbonneau, Triumph, supra note 
  Without the services of 
19, at 397 (“Arbitration embodies a trial 
process grounded in common sense, flexibility, and an ethic of problem-solving. . . . In other 
words, arbitration personifies due process and justice.”). 
 431. See Sternlight, supra note 205, at 680–96. 
 432. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
 433. See id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 205, at 637.  Sternlight’s thesis rests on the 
idea that arbitration is inherently unfair to consumers and that courts have inadequately 
protected consumers from these agreements. Id.; see also Brief for DRI, supra note 416, at 6 
(“[C]onsumers prevailed in 55 percent of the consumer-initiated cases that reached decision. 
. . . Another study found that consumers prevailed in consumer-initiated cases 65.5 percent 
of the time.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 434. See Ware, supra note 355, at 213 (“[T]he consumer’s right to government 
adjudication is alienable.  This empowers any and all consumers to get consideration for that 
right.”). 
 435. See supra notes 412–15 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 412–13 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 414–15 and accompanying text. 
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these two major arbitration services, a courtroom may be the only forum 
available to hear these cases. 
Modification of the policies of these institutions reflects a shift in the 
legal community’s attitude about consumer arbitration agreements.  While 
this change seems to reflect pressure from consumer groups rather than 
disapproval for arbitration on the part of the institutions themselves,438
2.  The Legislative Branch Seeks To Modify Arbitration 
 the 
shift in policy indicates that regardless of whether mandatory arbitration of 
consumer agreements harms consumers, overturning a longstanding policy 
of the Supreme Court is not the sole method by which these agreements 
may be avoided. 
In addition to protection from the banking and arbitration communities, 
the legislative branch has made steps toward increased consumer protection 
in the realm of arbitration.439  The numerous statutes that have been 
proposed in support of prohibiting mandatory arbitration of consumer 
contract disputes in the past few years suggest an imminent change to 
arbitration policy in the legislature.440  Recently, the Arbitration Fairness 
Act was reintroduced in Congress.441  The proposed statute would prohibit 
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses in consumer and employment 
contracts.442  Additionally, former Senator Russell Feingold, the sponsor of 
the bill, has suggested an arbitration bill of rights should a legislative 
prohibition prove too sweeping.443  Similarly, several scholars have 
suggested amendments to the FAA limiting the use of mandatory consumer 
arbitration agreements.444
 
 438. See Stempel, supra note 
  Should legislative modifications be made, courts 
may continue to enforce arbitration agreements that remain within the new 
restrictions, and parties may continue to use arbitration in those areas of 
dispute resolution where it provides a valuable function. 
413 (quoting a Bank of America spokeswoman as saying, 
“While the bank thinks arbitration is a very fair way to go, customers do not”). 
 439. See supra notes 407–10 and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra notes 407–10 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra notes 407–10 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra note 408. 
 443. See Feingold, supra note 18, at 298 (suggesting a cap on filing fees and costs, a 
limited right to discovery, and a requirement that arbitrators explain the reasoning behind 
decisions). 
 444. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 127, at 375 app. C (proposing that contracts between 
consumers and companies that “deny the consumer access to courts that would otherwise be 
available to the consumer to enforce legal claims” be invalidated); see also Speidel, supra 
note 19, at 1093–94 (proposing a “Federal Consumer Arbitration Act” that would invalidate 
arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts unless there is a clear disclosure of the 
agreement to arbitrate that explicitly informs the consumer that statutory rights will be 
included in the agreement to arbitrate.  The act would also require the arbitrator to issue a 
written opinion explaining any decision based on statutory rights). 
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3.  A New Agency Reconsiders Arbitration 
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically requires the Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency to examine the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements and to enact restrictions on the use of such clauses based on the 
study’s results.445
C.  A Simple Solution:  Outlaw Credit Repair Organizations 
  With this mandate, the Agency will be able to resolve 
the conflict over mandatory consumer arbitration and make targeted 
adjustments to the current law as needed. 
A blanket prohibition against the practices of credit repair organizations 
would respect the policy in favor of arbitration and address concerns about 
consumer rights.  The virtues of such organizations are few.446  Statements 
of both legislators and former members of the credit repair industry reflect 
the organizations’ lack of societal value and inherent potential for consumer 
harm.447
Georgia’s state version of the CROA
 
448 prohibits the operation of credit 
repair organizations, in an acknowledgement of the few benefits and 
plentiful dangers that these clinics pose.449  Several other states make 
CROA violations a felony.450  It is doubtful that similar action on the part 
of Congress would deprive the economy of a vital entity.  Considering the 
continued violations of credit repair organizations despite the passage of the 
CROA,451
CONCLUSION 
 a blanket prohibition against these agencies or an increase in the 
severity of the penalties these agencies face for violations would provide 
consumers with far greater protection than would simply prohibiting CROA 
claims from arbitration. 
The Credit Repair Organizations Act is vague in its discussion of rights 
to a judicial forum, causing confusion among consumers and credit repair 
agencies alike.  While a Supreme Court holding that the CROA precludes 
arbitration may nominally protect consumers, such a holding would 
ultimately weaken arbitration’s effectiveness as a form of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
 
 445. See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra notes 59, 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 448. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-59 (2007); see also supra Part I.D. 
 449. See Hearing, supra note 67, at 9 (“The credit repair industry is big business, big 
business that can’t be done.  It is legally impossible to change a credit rating unless a mistake 
has been made.”). 
 450. See supra note 100; see also Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While 
Supplies Last:  A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 592–
93 n.154 (2010) (noting that Congress and states passed credit repair organizations 
legislation because “[m]ost of the credit repair agencies turned out to be scams, with some 
even offering to rent other people’s credit scores to borrowers for fees of $2000 or more”). 
 451. See supra Part I.C. 
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An abrupt shift away from enforcement of arbitration agreements would 
throw years of Supreme Court jurisprudence into doubt.452  The current 
upsurge in the usage of ADR methods originated because of significant 
problems with the court system, and arbitration’s practicality has been 
affirmed by its current prevalence.453
 
  Because of arbitration’s evident 
usefulness, courts should be hesitant to abandon the policy of deference to 
arbitration.  To find that arbitration is precluded by a statute that articulates 
no clear prohibition of arbitration would drastically diminish the strength of 
arbitration as a fair and adequate process for conflict resolution in numerous 
other contexts.  Whether or not enforcement of these provisions harms 
consumers, the solution should not involve turning decades of pro-
arbitration Supreme Court jurisprudence on its head.  Alternate channels 
exist to avoid the social costs that may accrue from the enforcement of 
mandatory arbitration clauses.  A more effective method of consumer 
protection would be a wholesale ban on the operation of credit repair 
organizations.  For these reasons, enforcing arbitration clauses in this 
context would do little to damage consumer protection and would allow 
courts to continue to respect arbitration agreements in other areas of the 
law. 
 
 452. See supra Part II.C. 
 453. See supra Part II.C.5. 
